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Executive Summary
Random Number Generators (RNGs) and Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are basic
cryptographic primitives that can be used as generators of streams of random bits or random
numbers (vectors of bits). The generated random numbers appear either during device man-
ufacturing or its deployment: PUFs use randomness coming from the uncertainty appearing
only during the device production process and RNGs use dynamic sources of randomness during
device operation. Although the principles and characteristics of these two primitives are very
different, they have one property in common: the physical security relies on the underlying
hardware, topology and exploited technology, which means that they cannot be standardized,
because the physical characteristics change technology by technology, device by device. There-
fore, instead of proposing standard principles, which in fact cannot exist because of differences
in microelectronic technologies, we propose a standard design approach ensuring high physical
security.
The aim of this deliverable of the HECTOR project is to preselect principles of RNGs and
PUFs that fulfill strict technology, design, quality and security criteria, which are required for
generators of confidential keys. Many TRNG and PUF principles have been published up to
now, but also many of them are clearly not suitable for the stringent security-aware design.
While the need of the pre-selection of suitable TRNG and PUF designs was evident from the
beginning of the project, the selection criteria were not clearly defined. Therefore, the re-
quirements on key generators and the selection criteria were first discussed and adopted by all
partners involved in WP2.
Since the sources of randomness in TRNGs and PUFs are different, the requirements on
both primitives differ too and therefore, they needed to be analyzed separately. During the
pre-selection process, HECTOR partners analyzed, evaluated and discussed the best known
candidates from the point of view of their suitability for the adopted approach. The aim of this
process was to reduce the number of generators that will be further analyzed and implemented
in hardware. Despite the efforts made during the TRNG and PUF selection phase, the partners
agreed that some new principles could appear in the near future and therefore they decided to
leave the list of preselected principles open – any new candidates can be designed, studied and
implemented all along the HECTOR project.
This deliverable is organized as follows. After the main topic of the report is introduced
in Chapter 1, the theoretical and practical background of the design of RNGs and PUFs is
described in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, requirements specified by industrial partners and other
requirements coming from common practical needs in cryptographic applications are discussed
in detail. At the end of Chapter 3, main selection criteria for both RNGs and PUFs are
presented. The list of these criteria is a fruit of long lasting discussions between partners
involved in WP2. Chapter 4 presents selected RNG principles and evaluates each generator
regarding criteria, which were defined in Chapter 3. Similarly, Chapter 5 deals with selection
of PUF principles and their evaluation depending on given criteria. In Chapter 6, we present
results of implementation of pre-selected TRNG and PUF cores in FPGAs. Presented results
are discussed in detail at the end of this chapter. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this deliverable.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Random numbers are crucial in cryptography: they are used as confidential keys, padding
data, initialization vectors, nonces in challenge-response protocols, but also as random masks
in countermeasures against side channel attacks. Historically, they are generated by random
number generators (RNGs). RNGs are cryptographic primitives, which generate a sequence
of bits or symbols (e.g. groups of bits) that do not feature any pattern. The generated bits
or symbols must be independent and uniformly distributed. Recently, a new type of physical
random number generators has appeared - the physical unclonable functions (PUFs). PUFs can
be used for hardware authentication in a challenge-response protocol, but also as generators of
device-specific confidential keys.
The security of cryptographic systems is mainly linked to the protection of confidential keys.
In high end information security systems, when used in an uncontrolled environment, crypto-
graphic keys and random masks should never be generated outside the system and they should
never leave the system in clear. Consequently, if the security system is implemented in a single
chip (cryptographic system-on-chip), the keys should be generated inside the same chip, i.e. the
logic device. However, logic devices are aimed at implementation of deterministic logic systems
and not at realization of random number generation relying on analog physical phenomena.
The implementation of random number generators and PUFs in logic devices such as field pro-
grammable logic arrays (FPGAs) and digital application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) is
therefore a major challenge.
The design of electronic devices is evaluated by estimating their highest achievable speed
(characterized by the maximum clock frequency, latency and delay of the electronic block), cost
(expressed in area, e.g. in number of gates or logic elements), and power/energy consump-
tion. In cryptography, these basic criteria are completed by security characteristics, such as
robustness against attacks, and tamper resistance, which take priority.
An ideal device would be able to operate at maximum speed, lowest cost, having the lowest
power/energy consumption, and reaching the inviolable security. Clearly, such a device does
not exist and several compromises must be made during the design. The level of acceptable
compromises depends on the application.
The HECTOR project does not target some special application. Consequently, without
knowing the final use of the TRNG or PUF, the interval of acceptable compromises cannot be
delimited. Since the ideal solution does not exist, the strategy adopted in the HECTOR project
is to select several TRNG and PUF principles giving the best results and fulfilling the largest
set of constraints. The probability that the required characteristics of the TRNG or PUF will
be realizable using one of preselected principles is then expected to be the highest.
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As stated before, security has the highest priority in cryptographic applications. In imple-
mentations of algorithmic cryptographic functions, the security of the algorithm is ensured
by the thorough reviewing process, during which worldwide experts evaluate publicly security
parameters and robustness of the given algorithm. This security is then guaranteed at the algo-
rithmic level by the security standards, which define approved algorithms and their parameters,
versions, etc.
However, the physical security, which becomes vital in side channel attacks, random number
generators, and physical unclonable functions depends considerably on the underlying hardware,
topology, exploited technology, etc. Consequently, cryptographic primitives relying on physical
security cannot be standardized, because the physical characteristics change technology by
technology, device by device. In order to remedy this potential security weakness, instead of
proposing a standard hardware cryptographic block, the HECTOR project targets to propose
a standard design approach ensuring high physical security.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical and Practical Background
on RNGs and PUFs
RNGs and PUFs may be used to generate random numbers depending on random physical
processes that act upon the device either during its manufacturing or during its operation.
In this chapter, we will discuss the theoretical and practical background concerning these two
types of cryptographic hardware primitives. Since their principles and characteristics vary
considerably, they will be presented in two separate sections.
2.1 Random Number Generators
Random number generators are physical functions generating a sequence of bits or symbols
(e.g. groups of bits – numbers) that are independent, uniformly distributed and do not feature
any pattern. RNGs have many applications in modern technologies. They are widely used in
cryptography, but also in Monte Carlo simulations of complex systems, as noise generators in
telecommunication systems, in games, slot machines, etc.
Cryptographic applications have strong security requirements and RNGs included in them
must be cryptographically secure. This means that they must generate random numbers that
have good statistical quality and the generated sequences must not be predictable or manipu-
lable.
For this reason, RNGs which are targeted for data security applications must be designed
and analyzed very carefully. The next sections help in understanding the secure RNG design
and in establishing main RNG evaluation criteria.
2.1.1 RNG Design
Practical RNGs are grouped into two main categories: random number generators, also called
true random number generators (TRNGs), and pseudo-random number generators (PRGNs),
also called deterministic random number generators (DRNGs). Each category has different
characteristics, advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, most of the RNGs used in practice
are hybrid. Depending on the level of compromise in the choice of parameters, we distinguish
between hybrid TRNGs and hybrid DRNGs.
DRNGs use deterministic, mostly cryptographic algorithms for generating numbers that are
undisguishable from perfectly random numbers. Algorithms are selected in such a way that the
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resulting generator is very fast and gives perfect statistical results (e.g. the generated numbers
are uniformly distributed). However, it is clear that compared to an ideal random number
generator, the requirement of independence of output numbers cannot be fulfilled in the case
of deterministic generators.
On the other hand, generators of truly random numbers rely on some random process that
cannot be controlled. Depending on the source of randomness, we recognize physical (PTRNGs)
and non-physical (NPTRNG) random number generators. PTRNGs extract randomness from
some physical (in electronic devices mostly electric) phenomena, such as thermal noise, metasta-
bility, metastable oscillations, chaotic behavior in electronic devices, random initialization of
bi-stable circuits, etc. NPTRNGs extract randomness from unpredictable human-machine in-
teractions, such as electronic mouse movements, frequency of keystrokes, etc.
Hybrid random number generators (HRNGs) are usually composed of a DRNG preceded by a
TRNG and they take advantage of both building blocks: statistical quality and speed of DRNGs
and unpredictability of TRNGs. Characteristics of the hybrid TRNG are essentially determined
by those of the first true random number generator block, while the second deterministic block
should ensure computational complexity in the case of entropy failure in the first block. On the
other hand, characteristics of the hybrid DRNG are determined by the second deterministic
block, which is seeded regularly by the source of entropy situated in the first block.
When evaluating different RNG principles, security is the main criteria. Security in RNG
design is related to the statistical quality and unpredictability of the RNG output. Output
of a good generator aimed at cryptographic applications must have statistical properties that
are indistinguishable from those of an ideal RNG. This was the main classical RNG evalua-
tion criterion (see Fig. 2.1). Besides evaluating statistical parameters, new approaches require
evaluation of unpredictability. Unpredictability means that, knowing the current generator’s
output (or internal state in the case of DRNG), no preceding and following outputs can be
guessed with non negligible probability.
Unpredictability of DRNGs is related to the computational complexity of the underlying
algorithm, the length of the period, and the way the DRNG is initialized (entropy of the seed).
Unpredictability of TRNGs comes from the physical source of randomness and it is related to
the entropy rate in generated numbers: entropy rate per output bit equal to one guarantees
that the generator output cannot be predicted.
The TRNG is typically composed of a digital noise source, which exploits some physical
source of randomness, and an optional entropy conditioning block (see Fig. 2.1). The source of
randomness, the digitization mechanism, and the entropy harvesting principle are very depen-
dent on the selected technology and therefore a standard or even recommended TRNG does
not exist. Depending on characteristics of the source of randomness and quality of the digital
noise, designers select the entropy conditioning (also called post-processing) method aimed at
enhancing statistical properties of generated numbers.
TRNG output
Digital noise
source
Algorithmic 
post-processing Offline statistical 
testing using standard 
test suitesTRNG
Alarm S
Figure 2.1: Classical TRNG design and evaluation approach
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Historically, during the design and the security evaluation and certification process, the
TRNG principle and its implementation were evaluated statistically: generated numbers were
tested using standard test suites such as FIPS 140-1 [25], NIST SP 800-22 [59], DIEHARD [49],
and DIEHARDER [12]. The generator was not certified for the practical use if the statistical
tests did not succeed (i.e., if Alarm S from Fig. 2.1, was triggered).
This approach is not suitable for modern data security systems for several reasons: 1) the
post-processing can mask considerable weaknesses of the source of randomness; 2) generic
statistical tests can evaluate only the statistical quality of generated numbers and not their
entropy (which should guarantee unpredictability as the main security objective); 3) high-end
standard statistical tests are complex and thus expensive and slow, needing huge data sets.
Consequently, they are only executed occasionally or on demand and only on selected sets of
data of limited size.
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recently proposed an evaluation method-
ology for physical random number generators (AIS 31) [39], which should help designers to
better consider security aspects in their design and which should help evaluators of genera-
tors during the evaluation process. The AIS 31-compliant design and evaluation approach is
depicted in Fig. 2.2.
Raw
binary
signal Alarm S
Algorithmic & 
cryptographic 
post-processing
Online 
statist.
testing
External random numbers
Offline statistical 
testing –  standard 
test suites
TRNG
Digital noise 
source
Cryptographic module
Internal 
random 
numbers
Alarm O
Figure 2.2: AIS 31 compliant TRNG design and evaluation approach
The US government is currently working on a similar standard – NIST SP 800-90B [4].
Compared to the classical approach and similarly to the NIST SP 800-90B approach, the AIS
31:
• Redefines the role of an optional algorithmic post-processing – it should correct some occa-
sional small statistical imperfections of the raw binary signal (digital noise) and eventually
increase entropy per bit (usually by some data compression method).
• Adds mandatory cryptographic post-processing to ensure unpredictability of generated
numbers in forward and/or backward direction during a permanent or temporary failure
of the entropy source for the highest security levels.
• Defines an online testing strategy by permanently executing a simple and fast total failure
test and by executing at initialization and on demand an online test suite aimed at testing
raw binary signal (preferably) or internal random numbers.
• Requires either the construction of a statistical model aimed at entropy estimation and
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management or proof of robustness of the entropy source against variations of environ-
mental conditions.
The entropy rate estimated from the model for standard operational conditions can vary in
time. Several threats are related to the RNG design:
• Hardware related threats: Failure in generating good random numbers can be caused by
component aging, variations in the manufacturing process, and unstable and/or manipu-
lable entropy sources.
• Data leakage: An attacker might use data leaked from the random number generation
process to compromise security of the whole system.
• Temporary failure in provisioning random output: Some design can output weak numbers
before enough entropy is accumulated.
It is therefore important to test online the correct operation of the generator using some
dedicated tests. As specified in AIS 31, these tests must be based on the stochastic model
of the generator, to quickly detect generator-specific randomness failures (see Fig. 2.2). In
order to further speed-up reactions of statistical tests, it is preferable to test the quality of the
randomness as close to the source of randomness as possible.
Recently, a new enhanced AIS 31 compliant approach has been proposed in [26]. This
extended security approach is depicted in Fig. 2.3. Compared to the AIS31 technique, the new
Alarm R
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cryptographic 
post-processing
Online 
statist.
testing
Randomness 
monitoringDigital noise
source
External random numbers
Offline statistical 
testing –  standard 
test suites
TRNG
Source of 
randomness
Digitizer
Cryptographic module
Internal 
random 
numbers
Alarm O
Figure 2.3: Extended security TRNG design and evaluation approach
extended security approach adds evaluation of the source of randomness inside the source of
digital noise (before the digitization). This extension of the AIS 31 approach brings several
benefits:
• The entropy source testing represents a dedicated statistical test that is better suited to
the generator’s properties. It can thus be simpler, faster, and, at the same time, more
efficient than general purpose statistical tests, since it can better detect generator-specific
weaknesses.
• The entropy source testing can be realized as an embedded measurement of a random
physical parameter (e.g. thermal noise or phase jitter of a clock signal). The measured
value can then be used as an input parameter of the stochastic model of the source of
entropy and can serve for entropy estimation.
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• The parameterized stochastic model of the source of entropy together with the description
of the entropy extraction and algorithmic post-processing algorithms can be used to build
a stochastic model of the complete TRNG, which can serve for precise entropy manage-
ment ensuring the highest security level while maintaining the maximum obtainable bit
rate.
2.1.2 Sources of Randomness in Logic Devices
Most cryptographic modules implement more or less complex algorithmic functions and pro-
tocols. Therefore, they are implemented in logic devices, such as microprocessors, ASICs, and
FPGAs. However, RNGs and PUFs use some physical, mostly analog process as a source of ran-
domness. Unfortunately, implementing analog electronic blocks in integrated circuits needs a
mixed analog/digital technology, which is much more complex and expensive to exploit. There-
fore, one of HECTOR’s objectives is to exploit only a limited set of sources of randomness,
which are available in logic devices and which do not need any analog electronic component or
block.
The following set of sources of randomness is exploited the most frequently in practice:
• jitter in clock signals generated inside the logic devices,
• metastability of flip-flops and latches,
• oscillatory metastability in oscillating rings,
• initialization of flip-flops and memory elements to a random binary value.
In the next few paragraphs, we will discuss briefly these available sources of randomness and
their suitability for the RNG design approach adopted in the HECTOR project.
Jitter of the Clock Signal as a Source of Randomness
Oscillator based TRNGs in logic devices use the fact that the analog random noise signals
are transformed into the variation of the phase of the generated clock signal over time in the
oscillator circuitry. In the frequency domain, this variation is observed as a phase noise and in
the time domain as a phase jitter.
In the great majority of cases, the clock jitter has two components: random jitter, which is
caused by some non-deterministic phenomena like thermal or flicker noise, and deterministic
jitter, which is caused by a deterministic process.
As the name of the random jitter suggests, its behavior is random and the statistical tools
(e.g. mean value, variance, standard deviation) are therefore often used to quantify it. In most
cases, it obeys the central limit theorem and has a Gaussian probability distribution function
(PDF).
The deterministic jitter is typically caused by variations in the power supply (e.g. from
switching power supplies or other periodical signal sources), by cross-talks, by the electro-
magnetic interference (EMI), by a simultaneous switching of data signals and other regularly
occurring interference signals.
The main confusion when one is confronted with jitter measurement and quantification is
that some jitter metrics apply only to random jitter and not to deterministic jitter, whereas
deterministic jitter is almost always present.
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Clock jitter
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Random  sources (e.g. thermal and flicker noise)
Deterministic  sources (e.g. cross-talks)
Random  sources (e.g. random noise from EMI and power line)
Deterministic  sources (e.g. determ. signals from EMI and power)
Figure 2.4: Sources of the clock jitter in logic devices, the sources in the dashed boxes should
be avoided as they can be used to attack generators
Clock jitter can be caused by local and global sources, as shown in Fig. 2.4. The global
jitter sources, which can be random (e.g. the noise of the power supply) or deterministic (e.g.
external electromagnetic emanations), affect all transistors in the device in the same way and
are thus easier to reduce. The local jitter sources, also random (e.g. thermal noise or flicker
noise) or deterministic (e.g. data dependent cross-talks), affect all the transistors differently
and are thus more difficult to eliminate.
Global jitter sources are very dangerous, because they are easy to manipulate. Fortunately,
the impact of the global jitter sources on the generated random numbers can be reduced using
the fact that identical blocks will be affected in the same way. Therefore, by using a differential
TRNG design, e.g. by exploiting pairs of identical clock generators and differentiating their
output, the effect of global jitter sources can be significantly reduced [27].
The impact of the local deterministic sources on the generated numbers can be reduced only
in carefully designed generators. The oscillators used as sources of jittery clock signals must be
physically isolated from the rest of the device as well as from each other, the interconnection
wires must be as thin and as short as possible to avoid capacitive and inductive coupling.
Unfortunately, this is very difficult to achieve in FPGAs and sometimes also in ASICs.
Metastability of Flip-Flops and Latches as a Source of Randomness
Metastability can be defined as the ability of an unstable equilibrium electronic state to persist
for an indefinite period in a digital system. The metastable events are very dangerous, since
they can cause the whole system to stall in an unknown state for a random time period.
The metastability of a flip-flop or latch can be caused by sampling the input signal exactly
during its rising or falling edge. Entering a metastable state causes two random phenomena
to occur: 1) the duration of the metastable state (the settling time) is random; 2) the stable
state, to which the metastable state resolves, has a random value. For the risk-free operation of
the logic device, the metastable states must be avoided, i.e. the input signal must be sampled
outside the setup and hold time interval defined by the vendor for each device family or after
the settling time.
RNGs claiming to exploit metastability, force the sampling to act inside the setup and hold
interval. Although in that case the metastable events are inevitable, they can be very rare
and therefore, they are not suitable as a fast source of randomness. Although some papers
claiming to use metastability obtain the output bit rate of several Mbits/s, they rather use the
noise, which appears during the sampling operation and which determines the state to which
the flip-flop recovers after the settling time.
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Oscillatory Metastability
Oscillatory metastability can be defined as the ability of a bi-stable circuit (e.g. an RS flip-flop)
to oscillate for an indefinite period. It was studied by Reyneri et al. in [57]. The oscillatory
metastability is very suitable as the source of randomness for two reasons: the oscillating
circuits can be very small and the random event (randomly lasting oscillations) can be easily
transformed to random numbers by a simple counter of oscillations.
Initialization of Flip-Flops or Memory Elements to a Random Value
Flip-flops and memory elements based on flip-flops (volatile memory elements) can be initialized
systematically to one, to zero, or to some random value. Proportion of this three initialization
states depends on the technology and the design of the flip-flop. This kind of source of random-
ness is not suitable for FPGAs, because all available flip-flops are initialized to a known state,
but it can be in some circumstances (if the flip-flop is designed so that the random initialization
state dominates and the obtained values are not biased) exploited in ASICs. In order to obtain
high output bit rate, the flip-flop can be initialized periodically, as it is made in the latest Intel
RNG [66].
Single-Event Ring Oscillators as Sources of Jittery Clocks
A single-event ring oscillator is a loop built of logic gates containing an odd number of inverting
gates, mostly inverters, and any number of non-inverting gates. Two kinds of ring oscillators
are used as sources of randomness (see Fig. 2.5): the conventional free running ring oscillator
in the left panel is composed of an odd number of inverters; the ring oscillator with a control
input (in the right panel) is composed of a NAND gate and a sufficient number of non-inverting
logic gates or buffers used as delay elements.
When the ring is oscillating (oscillations in the controlled ring from the right panel in Fig. 2.5
must be enabled), the output of each inverting gate (the inverter on the left or the NAND gate
output on the right side) toggles periodically between two logic states. The main feature of the
single-event ring oscillator is that only one event (i.e. a rising or falling edge of the generated
periodic signal) is present in the ring at any given time.
The period of a single-event ring oscillator is equal to the time, which the event needs to
pass two times across the ring (first as the rising and then as the falling edge of the generated
signal or vice versa).
In the simplified noise-free model with ideal interconnections (noise-free, zero impedance
connections) and constant delay of all delay elements, the period of the generated signal is
T = 2 ·
n∑
i=1
di,
where di is the delay of the i-th element of the ring and n is the number of elements.
In the real world, elements of the ring do not have constant delays, their delays vary individ-
ually depending on local and global jitter sources causing the clock jitter.
Today, conventional ring oscillators are the most commonly used sources of randomness.
Their success is certainly due to the simplicity of their implementation in logic devices. Their
main disadvantage is the strong frequency dependence on temperature and on power supply
voltage, which makes them vulnerable to external manipulations. Moreover, it was shown
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Figure 2.5: Free running, single-event ring oscillator (left panel) and single-event ring oscillator
with a control input (right panel): in both cases, only one event crosses the ring at any time
in [9] that in some circumstances, ring oscillators can lock to each other due to cross-talks.
This mutual locking can be fatal for the entropy harvesting mechanism. Jitter sources in ring
oscillators are well studied and modeled, but because of shrinking submicron technologies, the
models have to continuously evolve.
Multi-Event Ring Oscillators with Signal Collisions
A multi-event ring oscillator with collisions is a loop built of logic gates, which contains an even
number of inverting gates and any number of non-inverting gates. Because of the even number
of inverting gates, the oscillator must be restarted regularly – the multiple events created after
each restart circulate inside the loop until a collision occurs, during which the edge which
moves faster reaches the slower one. The difference in speed of circulating events is caused
by differences in delays in loop branches between inverters and by analog phenomena in the
inverter circuitry. The circulating events create temporary oscillations which disappear after
the last collision.
The most common configuration of the multi-event ring oscillator with collisions is the tran-
sition effect ring oscillator (TERO), which features the so-called oscillatory metastability, in
which oscillations last randomly, theoretically sometimes infinitely [57].
The TERO is a loop composed of an even number of inverters and a couple of gates which are
used to restart temporary oscillations (e.g. two NAND, two NOR, or two XOR gates). A typical
TERO configuration is presented in the left panel in Fig. 2.6: it is composed of two NAND
gates and two inverter chains, each inverter chain containing an even number of inverters. The
TERO can be seen as an RS latch with two inputs controlled by the same signal Vctr and two
outputs Vout1 and Vout2.
Following the rising edge of the Vctr input, the outputs Vout1 and Vout2 start to oscillate. The
oscillations have a constant mean frequency, but their duty cycle varies over time: it changes
monotonously and after a certain number of oscillations, it reaches the rate of either 0% or
100%. At this point, outputs Vout1 and Vout2 stop oscillating and remain stable at two opposite
logic values. The right panel in Fig. 2.6 presents traces of the Vctr input and Vout1 output signals
captured from the oscilloscope.
The three zooms presented in this panel reveal the varying duty cycle: immediately after
the rising edge of the Vctr signal, it is close to 50%, after which it decreases (as the faster edge
catches up with the slower one) until it reaches 0%. Consequently, the signal Vout1 stabilizes at
logic level 0. Of course, as far as the duty cycle is concerned, the signal Vout2 behaves in the
opposite way and stabilizes at logic level 1.
The number of oscillations before the outputs stabilize is not constant but variable because
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Figure 2.6: Circuit diagram of typical TERO structures based on inverters and buffers (a) and
their input/output waveforms (b)
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Figure 2.7: Architecture of a self-timed ring
it is affected by the electronic noises which disturb the normal behavior of transistors in the
TERO structure, which in turn dynamically alter the delays of individual delay elements.
Multi-Event Ring Oscillators without Signal Collisions
An example of the multi-event ring oscillator without signal collisions is the self-timed ring
(STR). STRs are oscillators in which several events (electrical transitions) can propagate evenly-
spaced in time thanks to analog mechanisms, which act in each STR stage. The STR structure
is depicted in Fig. 2.7. It corresponds to the control circuit of an asynchronous micropipeline
as proposed by I. E. Sutherland in [65], which has been closed to form a ring.
The STR is composed of L stages, each consisting of a Muller gate and an inverter. Fi is the
forward input of the i-th stage, associated with a forward static delay Dff , Ri is the reverse
input of the same stage, associated with a reverse static delay Drr, and Ci is the output of the
stage. As is clear from the truth table of one self-timed ring stage presented in Table 2.1, the
forward input value is written to the stage output if the forward and reverse input values are
different. Otherwise, the previous output is maintained.
The STR stages communicate using the two-phase handshake protocol described in [65]. Each
request and acknowledgment signifies the transfer of an event between interconnected stages.
In contrast to inverter ring oscillators, several events can propagate without colliding thanks
to this handshake protocol, which enables precise, built-in frequency and phase control of the
internal clock signals by setting up the appropriate number of propagating events when the
ring is initialized.
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Fi Ri Ci
0 0 unchanged
0 1 0
1 0 1
1 1 unchanged
Table 2.1: Truth table of a stage of the self-timed ring
C1 Event 1
C2
C3
C4
C5
Event 2
 
Time
Figure 2.8: Illustration of the evenly-spaced propagation of two events in a 5-stage STR
In practice, the ring is initialized with N events which start propagating during a transient
state. Independently of their initial positions and thanks to two analog mechanisms inferred
in the ring (the Charlie and the drafting effects), they end up in a steady state in which they
arrange themselves in one of two ways: they either form a cluster which propagates in the ring
(burst oscillation mode), or they spread out around the ring and propagate with a constant
temporal spacing (evenly-spaced oscillation mode). Both these oscillation modes are stable
and depend on the static parameters of the ring (mainly the ring occupancy N/(L −N) with
respect to the ratio of static delays Dff/Drr). Fig. 2.8 shows the waveforms of the evenly-spaced
propagation of two events in a 5-stage STR.
Charlie diagrams were first used by Ebergen et al. to predict the timing behavior of a Muller
gate as a function of the separation time between the input events which drive the gate [19].
Winstanley et al. carried on the study by introducing another analog effect which affects the
timings of events in STR stages – the drafting effect [73].
The Charlie effect determines the impact of the separation time between input events on a
Muller gate delay: the closer the arrival times of events at inputs, the longer the gate propa-
gation delay. The drafting effect describes the impact of the elapsed time from the last output
commutation on the stage propagation delay: the shorter this time, the shorter the stage prop-
agation delay.
In [22], S. Fairbanks et al. showed that the Charlie effect promotes the evenly-spaced propa-
gation mode while the drafting effect promotes the burst propagation mode. The Charlie effect
causes two close events to push away from each other due to the increased delay experienced
by a ring stage when driven by two events separated with a short time lapse.
If several events are constrained in a short ring structure, the Charlie effect is retroactive:
events keep pushing away from each other until they are evenly spread out across the ring,
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which causes the evenly-spaced propagation mode of the STR.
On the other hand, the drafting effect causes two events to approach each other because of
the reduced propagation delay of a ring stage when it switches faster, thereby promoting the
burst propagation mode of the STR.
In practice, the evenly-spaced mode is obtained for a range of events centered around N0
which fulfills the following relation [31]:
N0
L−N0 =
Dff
Drr
(2.1)
The burst oscillation mode is obtained for corner values of the number of events. The stronger
the Charlie effect, the longer the interval between events when the ring achieves the evenly-
spaced propagation mode. For example, a 64-stage self-timed ring in Altera Cyclone III with
Dff
Drr
' 1 in [13] used the evenly-spaced mode for N varying between 22 and 42, while the same
64-stage configuration in Xilinx Virtex 5 achieved the evenly-spaced mode for N between 28
and 38. This suggests the Charlie effect is stronger in the Cyclone III STR implementation.
In contrast to inverter ring oscillators, the frequency of an STR in the evenly-spaced regime
is a function of its occupancy and not of the number of its stages. The frequency of oscillations
increases with number of events N , then starts to drop when the number of free stages is less
than the number of events to be processed with respect to the asymmetry of the ring stages.
The maximum frequency is reached when the number of events is equal to N0 from Eq. (2.1).
Conversely to inverter ring oscillators, STRs can reach phase resolutions which are fractions
of the propagation delay of a single logic gate. Fig. 2.8 shows how a phase resolution below to
the propagation delay of a single ring stage can be obtained using the STR. The propagation
of an event in an STR causes a 180 degree phase shift of the oscillating signal. If N events
are confined in L stages and spread evenly around the ring, the phase shift between two stages
separated by n stages is [22]:
ϕn = n× N
L
× 180 (2.2)
Therefore, if the number of events is a factor of the number of stages, some stages may exhibit
the same absolute phase. But if the number of events and the number of stages are co-prime,
the STR exhibits as many different equidistant phases as the number of stages. In this case, if
T is the oscillation period, the phase resolution can be expressed as follows [13]:
4ϕ = T
2L
(2.3)
On the other hand, the oscillation period of an STR is a function of its occupancy rather
than of the number of its stages. This means that it is possible to increase the number of ring
stages (L) while keeping a constant frequency. Consequently, the phase resolution of an STR
can theoretically be set as finely as needed. Elissati et al. demonstrated the efficiency of the
method in [20] by implementing several designs and obtained phase resolutions in the order of
picoseconds.
2.1.3 Randomness Extraction
Entropy harvesting methods are used to obtain digital noise from the clock signals. In general,
two principles can be used: sampling of a jittery clock signal and counting the edges of the
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Figure 2.10: Entropy harvesting by counting the periods of the jittery clock signal
jittery clock signal during a fixed time interval. Although the two principles may seem similar,
their stochastic models can considerably differ.
The principle of the entropy harvesting method based on sampling of jittery clock signals is
presented in Fig. 2.9. It uses M jittery clock signals as M sources of randomness. The clock
signals are added modulo 2 in a XOR gate before being sampled at the reference clock in a
D flip-flop. Although the phases of the clock signals are uniformly distributed, the frequency
of the reference clock signal and hence the output bit rate of the generator can be very high
comparing to the agility (spectrum) of the jitter. Another practical limit of the output bit
rate is the bandwidth of the XOR gate (many high-frequency signals have to be XOR-ed).
However, this problem can be solved by synchronizing the clock signals generated in rings on
the reference clock in additional D flip-flops connected between rings and the XOR gate (not
depicted in Fig. 2.9).
The entropy harvesting method based on counting the jittery clock periods is presented in
Fig. 2.10. This method uses two clock signals: a reference clock signal and a jittery clock signal.
In practice, both signals include some jitter, but if they come from independent generators, the
jitter of the reference clock can be added to the jitter of the jittery clock signal and the reference
clock can then be assumed to be jitter free. The time base generator generates the time interval
τ which enables the m-bit counter. Because of period instability of the jittery clock signal, the
counter values vary after each measurement interval τ as depicted in the right panel in Fig. 2.10.
2.1.4 Evaluation and Testing of RNGs
RNGs must be thoroughly evaluated from the point of view of security during their design, but
also during the certification procedure according to AIS 20/31 [39], or NIST SP 800-90 [4].
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Evaluation of the Security and Entropy Estimation
Security in random number generation is related to the unpredictability of the generated num-
bers. The unpredictability is characterized by the entropy, which is a measure of the guesswork
of the attacker. In order to guarantee unpredictability, the entropy rate of an n-bit random
vector should be as close as possible to n.
Several definitions of entropy exist. The most general entropy definition is that of Re´nyi [56].
The Re´nyi entropy is defined as follows:
Hα(X) =
1
1− α log2
(
n∑
i=1
(pi)
α
)
, (2.4)
where α ≥ 0, α 6= 1 and pi =Pr[X = xi]. In general, the Re´nyi entropy is difficult to estimate
in practice. Instead, two special cases of the Re´nyi entropy are used: the min-entropy and the
Shannon entropy.
The min-entropy is the most conservative entropy measure. It is based on the fact that the
Re´nyi entropy is monotonously decreasing with α. Consequently, it reaches the minimum value
(the min-entropy) for α→∞. The min-entropy is thus defined as follows:
H∞(X) = inf
i=1..n
(− log2(pi)) = − log2 sup
i=1..n
pi. (2.5)
The conservativeness of the min-entropy can be useful for guaranteeing security, however, its
definition as presented in Eq. (2.5) is valid only for independent variables. Therefore, when
using min-entropy as the entropy measure, the designer must thoroughly evaluate independence
of the generated values.
The most common entropy definition is the Shannon entropy. It can be obtained from the
Re´nyi entropy for α→ 1:
H(X) = H1(X) = −
n∑
i=1
pi log2 pi (2.6)
Similarly to min-entropy, Eq. (2.6) is valid directly only if the generated random numbers
are independent. If the generated numbers are somehow mutually dependent, the so-called
conditional entropy based on the Shanon entropy definition can be used [39].
The probability of an n-bit vector with a nearly uniform distribution should be close to
Pr(X1 = x1, X2 = x2, ..., Xn = xn) = 1/2
n. As stated before, the entropy of this vector is close
to n. Consequently, the entropy per bit of a TRNG should be close to 1 (according to AIS31,
for internal random numbers, H(X) > 0.997).
A high entropy rate guarantees that the preceding or succeeding bits cannot be guessed
with a probability different from 0.5. Random variables, which are independent and uniformly
distributed, feature the so-called full entropy (ideal RNG outputs full entropy numbers).
Unfortunately, the entropy is the property of random variables and not that of observed
realizations. Consequently, the entropy cannot be directly measured. In a mathematically
stringent approach, the entropy should be estimated using the stochastic model of the generator.
Two different approaches are applied in Europe and in USA for entropy estimation. The
European AIS 20/31 [39] requires designer to construct a stochastic model and to use it for
entropy estimation. On the contrary, the draft of the American standard NIST SP 800-90B
uses a set of simple statistical tests to estimate the min-entropy. This second approach can
be security critical, especially if the generated numbers are not independent (e.g. they include
some pseudo-randomness).
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Stochastic Modeling of Random Number Generators
The stochastic model specifies the family of probability distributions that contains all possible
distributions of the generated random numbers. The stochastic model can include or not
the post-processing function. The main objective of the stochastic model is to characterize
probability that an output bit is equal to one (Pr(X = 1)), and/or probability that an n-bit
vector features some pattern ( Pr(X1 = x1, X2 = x2, ..., Xn = xn)) and from them the entropy
(if the variables are independent and identically distributed – IID) or conditional entropy (if
the variables are not IID) per output number.
When constructing or verifying the stochastic model, the designer and the evaluator must:
• observe if the generated numbers are stationary, i.e. if their statistical parameters do not
change in time,
• observe the distribution of random numbers in different extreme and corner conditions in
order to verify that the generator is robust to variations of operational conditions if they
vary in acceptable ranges,
• observe if the random variables are IID or not,
• characterize (or verify) the distribution of generated random numbers – the stochastic
model.
The stochastic model has double utility in exploitation of RNGs: 1) it serves for characterizing
unpredictability of the generated numbers (the entropy); 2) it serves as a basis for construction
of RNG-specific statistical tests (i.e. dedicated tests).
If the generated random numbers are IID, the min-entropy or Shannon entropy can be used
to characterize unpredictability. If the generated numbers are not IID, the conditional entropy
should be used instead.
Evaluation of the Statistical Quality of Generated Numbers
During the RNG design, during the security certification process, and also when the generator
is in operation, the RNGs must be thoroughly tested using statistical tests. The statistical tests
are mathematical tools aimed at evaluation of the statistical quality of generated numbers.
Following the common strategy in statistical testing, different statistical features of an ideal
RNG are evaluated and then compared with output values of a real RNG (i.e. design under
test – DUT) for verification of the so-called null hypothesis – H0. The null hypothesis is the
assumption that the generator is indeed random, i.e. that it behaves as an ideal RNG.
The number of more or less complex statistical features, which could be evaluated, is theo-
retically unlimited. For practical reasons, usually only up to 16 features are tested. The most
common general-purpose statistical test suites (also called the black box tests) are FIPS 140-1
[25], NIST SP 800-22 [59], DIEHARD [49], and DIEHARDER [12].
Recall that the statistical testing of the generator is necessary, but not sufficient for the
thorough security evaluation – it cannot substitute the cryptanalysis in the case of DRNGs and
the estimation of the entropy rate in the case of TRNGs. The statistical testing is performed
in two phases of the RNG exploitation: oﬄine and online.
The RNG is tested oﬄine during the design and security evaluation/certification process (by
developers and testers). This kind of testing is performed using testing procedures required by
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security standards (i.e. AIS 20/31 [39] or NIST SP 800-90B [4]) and optionally also using the
general purpose (black box) statistical tests.
The AIS20/31 testing strategy requires two groups of tests to be executed in two testing
procedures: Procedure A and Procedure B. In Procedure A, tests T0 to T5 are applied on
generated random numbers (so-called internal random numbers). In Procedure B, tests T6 to
T8 are applied either on raw random numbers (if they are available) or on internal random
numbers.
The NIST SP 800-90B uses two groups of tests, too. The aim of the first group is to verify
that the generated numbers are IID and in the positive case to estimate min-entropy using
Eq. 2.5. If the generated numbers are not IID, the second group of tests is used for entropy
estimation. The most conservative entropy estimation is then taken as a result of testing.
According to recent security standards [39], [4], the RNG must also be tested online, to
detect dynamically intolerable changes in quality of generated numbers. The online testing is
performed using embedded, RNG-specific, statistical tests based on a suitable stochastic model.
Three kinds of dedicated online tests must be performed:
• Continuous test(s),
• Online test(s),
• Startup test(s).
The coarse continuous tests must be able to rapidly detect important deviations from the
normal RNG operation, e.g. to detect the total entropy failure. If the test fails, the generator
must stop the generation of random numbers immediately.
The continuous test must have low probability of the false alarm, because each alert causes
the full restart of the generator, including the time consuming startup tests. Consequently, in
the worst case, i.e. when the alarm is triggered too often, the generator could be permanently
disabled. The speed and the reliability of the continuous tests can be significantly increased
if the tests were based on an appropriate stochastic model – the test could evaluate the most
important statistical features of the generator.
More precise online tests are aimed at detection of subtle entropy failures. The level of
failures that can be accepted is determined by the post-processing mechanism (see the following
subsection). Due to the higher precision of online tests, their execution time is much higher
than that of the continuous tests.
Consequently, the time interval between the entropy failure and the alarm is also much
longer. During this time interval, the correct operation of the generator must be ensured by
some backup solution: the generator must behave as a pseudo-random number generator or
some sufficient entropy amount must be accumulated and delivered from an internal buffer. Of
course, in order to increase the speed and the precision of the online tests, they should be based
on the stochastic model of the generator, too.
The startup tests are launched at each initialization of the generator and after each security
alert (e.g. because of alarms coming from the continuous tests or from the online tests). During
startup tests, first, the operation of the continuous tests and of the online tests must be tested
(the tests themselves must be tested), then, they must be executed at least once, and finally,
the algorithmic part of the generator (e.g. the randomness harvesting mechanism and the
post-processing block) must be tested, too.
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2.1.5 Post-Processing of the Raw Random Numbers
As explained in Section 2.1.1, the post-processing of the raw random numbers plays a double
role in the RNG design: 1) the algorithmic post-processing block corrects some occasional
small statistical imperfections of the raw random numbers and eventually increase entropy per
bit; 2) the cryptographic post-processing function ensures temporarily the unpredictability of
generated numbers in forward and/or backward direction, before the online tests detected some
previously appeared failure of the entropy source.
Algorithmic Post-Processing
The role of the entropy extractor as a general kind of the algorithmic post-processing function
is to transform generated numbers featuring an imperfect distribution to numbers featuring
(nearly) uniform distribution. The closeness of the distribution of generated numbers to that
of an ideal one (i.e. to the uniform distribution) can be evaluated using a statistical distance
defined as:
∆(X, Y ) = max
T⊂S
|Pr[X ∈ T ]− Pr[Y ∈ T ]|, (2.7)
where X and Y are random variables having different probability distributions. Then, we say
that X and Y are ε-close if ∆(X, Y ) ≤ ε.
The deterministic entropy extractor (called (k, ε)-extractor) takes an n-bit sample from a
weak random source as an input and gives an m-bit output (n > m) that is statistically ε-close
to the uniform distribution Um. In other words, the m-bit vector present at the output of the
post-processing has the min-entropy k (i.e. m is close to k).
The entropy extractor is usually realized by some data compression method. The compression
factor can be determined from the known distribution of the raw random numbers at the input of
the post-processing function and the required ε-closeness to the uniform distribution. The value
of ε can be computed from the required lower bound of the min-entropy and Equation (2.5).
Cryptographic Post-Processing
As explained before, the cryptographic post-processing ensures unpredictability of the generator
output, when the source of entropy fails. The cryptographic post-processing block should use
an approved cryptographic algorithm depending on the required security level (direction of
unpredictability) and according to rules defined for cryptographically secure pseudo-random
number generators [39].
2.1.6 Conclusion
It is clear that unlike algorithmic cryptographic primitives, TRNG principles cannot be stan-
dardized. However, for practical reasons, it could be very useful if several principles that are
compliant with the new enhanced security approach could be pre-selected and some convenient
stochastic models and embedded tests developed for them. Moreover, according to entropy esti-
mation, a suitable post-processing method should be proposed. The role of the TRNG designer
would then be simple:
• Depending on performance and security requirements, implement one generator principle
in selected technology.
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• Evaluate the amount of randomness in the given technology using existing embedded
tests of entropy (note that pre-selected TRNG principles must have suitable embedded
tests/randomness measurement available).
• Using the measured parameter, estimate the entropy per bit of the raw binary signal
using an existing stochastic model of the source of randomness and select suitable entropy
extraction and algorithmic post-processing methods (from a set of options).
• Depending on the stochastic model of the source of randomness, entropy extraction and
postprocessing algorithm selection, estimate the entropy per bit (pattern) at the genera-
tors output.
• Evaluate the generator using the AIS 31 methodology and known entropy.
2.2 Physical Unclonable Functions
For the design of digital electronic systems, two possible techniques exist that enable the trace-
ability of integrated circuits using intrinsic identification: fingerprinting and watermarking.
Fingerprinting is the measurement of a physical or behavioral characteristic of an integrated
circuit. This characteristic allows the designer to identify each integrated circuit individually.
Watermarking is a technique of steganography which proves the ownership of an integrated
circuit (or an IP block) by checking for the presence of hidden information, called a watermark.
A new approach to fingerprinting electronic devices emerged recently and has attracted wide
attention in the last few years. The new cryptographic primitive aims to physically identify
hardware systems, instead of giving them an explicitly programmed digital identity. The con-
cept of physical unclonable functions (PUFs) was first introduced by Pappu in [54].
2.2.1 PUF Design
Silicon PUFs can extract unique secret keys from the physical characteristics of the device using
a challenge and response procedure based on a physical interaction that is extremely hard or
even impossible to reproduce. Entropy is derived from a physical random variable such as
the mismatch between transistor attributes (length, width, oxide thickness, etc.) caused by
variability of the manufacturing process (MPV).
The basic principle is that MPV is neither controllable (it is not predictable) nor reproducible,
but can be measured. Ideally, when a PUF is challenged, its response is unique (each device
has a unique, non-reproducible response based on its unique physical characteristics), random
(it is uniformly distributed and cannot be predicted), steady (each device always gives the same
response to a given challenge) and in some cases tamper resistant (probing the PUF changes
its physical behavior and hence the response obtained). Figure Fig. 2.11 is an illustration of
the behavior of a silicon PUF.
Many silicon based PUF architectures exist, but two main approaches are used to extract
entropy from MPV in digital devices: methods based on the measurement or comparison of
timing, and methods that exploit the resolution from a metastable state.
The arbiter PUF [42] relies on the race between two events (electrical transitions) in two
identical delay lines. The ring oscillator based PUF [63] (RO-PUF) leverages the frequency
mismatch between several identically designed ring oscillators (ROs). SRAM-PUFs [36] and
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Figure 2.11: Illustration of the behavior of PUF: three chips from the same wafer embed the
same PUF, they are packaged in three integrated circuits, and after receiving the same challenge,
each PUF provides a unique, unpredictable, and steady response because of variations in the
CMOS production process
butterfly PUFs [41] rely on the settling state of cross-coupled elements: at the initialization of
a SRAM, most cells’ outputs are biased toward 1 or 0 depending on the MPV.
2.2.2 Statistical Evaluation of PUFs
Concerning statistical evaluation of PUFs, comparing to TRNG evaluation, the situation is
much more complex. While TRNGs can generate huge amount of data, the evaluation of PUFs
needs huge amount of PUF implementations (devices). Clearly, this is practically never the
case. Practical testing is thus often replaced by simulations.
The statistical evaluation of a PUF must consider at least three factors: inter-device variation,
intra-device variation obtained at nominal and corner temperatures and power supply voltages,
and randomness of the response. They are defined as follows:
• Inter-device variation (also called uniqueness [48], [37]) shows to what extent the re-
sponses generated by the PUF in different devices are unique.
• Intra-device variation (also called reliability [48], robustness or steadiness [37]) quantifies
changes at the output of a PUF function over many measurements with environmental
changes (i.e. temperature variation, VDD variation).
• Randomness is evaluated by statistically testing the PUF response (often only the bias
of the response is evaluated).
In the following, let us consider a set of N devices denoted (di)1≤i≤N , and let n-bit responses
be extracted L times from each device. We denote rij(p) (with 1 ≤ i ≤ N and 1 ≤ j ≤ L) the
j-th response of the device di to the challenge cp.
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Inter-Device Variation
For a given challenge cp, the responses from two devices di and dj must differ with high proba-
bility (ril(p) 6= rjm(p) with 1 ≤ l,m ≤ L ). One common indicator of this characteristic is the
inter-chip Hamming distance, which is computed using the following equation:
EC =
1
N(N − 1)L
N∑
i=1
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
L∑
j=1
HD(rij(p), r¯k(p))
n
× 100% (2.8)
where rij(p) is the j-th response obtained from the device di, r¯k(p) is the mean value of L
responses obtained from device dk, n is the size of the response vectors, and HD is the Hamming
distance between two vectors.
The optimal value of this indicator is 50%. In the following, we refer to this indicator simply
as to uniqueness. In practical PUF applications, the uniqueness determines the size of identifiers
needed to distinguish between certain number of devices.
Intra-Device Variation
For a given challenge cp, which is repeated several times, all the responses of device di should
be the same (i.e. response rij(p) should not vary over time). A common indicator used to
characterize the steadiness (also called reliability or robustness) is the intra-chip Hamming
distance. For device di operating at temperature T and power supply voltage V , it is computed
using the following equation:
ICi(T, V ) =
1
L
L∑
j=1
HD(rij(p), rref (p))
n
× 100%, (2.9)
where rref (p) is a reference response (associated with the challenge cp and the device di) obtained
at nominal voltage Vn and temperature Tn.
The optimal value of this indicator is 0%. In the following, we refer to this indicator simply
as to steadiness. Low steadiness values mean that the PUF is reliable. In practice, the PUF
steadiness determines the cost of error correction needed to obtain reliable identifiers and/or
the voltage and temperature ranges for the proper PUF operation.
Randomness
For a given challenge cp, the responses rij(p) (with 1 ≤ j ≤ L) should be unpredictable and
uniformly distributed. In practice, the randomness determines the vulnerability of the PUF to
brute force and modeling attacks. Evaluating randomness of PUFs can be challenging, because
large amount of data (and therefore large number of test chips) is required. However, some
statistical tests issued from the NIST SP 800-22 test suite [59] can be adapted to test small
amount of data, although these tests will consequently have a low confidence level. The main
objective of this evaluation is to rapidly eliminate responses which are not random. On the other
hand, the designer wants to evaluate randomness, which comes exclusively from the MPV. He
can for example merge sufficient number of PUF responses to obtain a longer sequence, which
can then be tested using six statistical tests (depending on parameters, which define the minimal
length of the input [59]):
• T1 is the frequency (monobit) test, which evaluates the bias of the sequence,
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• T2 is the frequency test within a block (for 2-bit, 3-bit and 4-bit blocks),
• T3 is the cumulative sums test,
• T4 is the runs tests (which evaluates the distribution of runs of ones),
• T5 is the longest run test (the longest run of ones is searched),
• T6 is the approximate entropy test which evaluates the distribution of M -bit overlapping
blocks in the sequences (with M = 2,M = 3 and M = 4).
In next steps, the designer can estimate the overall bias of the responses using the Shannon
entropy. Here again, responses have to be filtered to remove the noise and to estimate entropy
coming from the MPV and not from the random noise. The Shannon entropy H is computed
as follows:
H¯ =
1
n×N
n∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
−pk,ilog2(pk,i)− (1− pk,i)log2(1− pk,i) (2.10)
where pk,i is the probability that ¯rk(p) =
1
L
∑L
j=1 rk,j(p) is equal to 1. The optimal value of this
indicator is 1.
Note that most of previous works evaluate the randomness only from the bias. This approach
is clearly not sufficient, since it does not take into account correlations between the generated
bits.
2.2.3 Post-Processing of the PUF Output
Since PUFs are physical noisy functions, mechanisms have to be put in place to cope with this
noise. Post-processing by helper data algorithms is indispensable to meet stringent requirements
for cryptographic keys in security-critical products: reproducibility, high-entropy and output
control requirements.
1. Reproducibility – this is always required. It is common practice to define a maximum
failure rate for the key reconstruction phase, e.g. PFAIL ≤ 10−6. This is coupled to a
certain manufacturing yield: PUF noisiness and hence also PFAIL shows a spread among
devices.
2. Uniformity of the distribution – keys are assumed to have maximum entropy. For
some applications, entropy loss can be forgiven, given the use of a longer key. E.g. for
the computation of a HMAC, the application penalty might be low.
3. Output control requirements – represented by three requirements:
(a) PUF independence – one might wish to program a key which does not depend
on the PUF. This requirement does not necessarily imply a full control over the
key bits: the helper data algorithm might perform additional hashing for instance.
Consider for example a symmetric key communication between two PUF devices
with the same helper data algorithm, or the replacement of a malfunctioning device
with preservation of the key.
(b) Mathematical restrictions – the key might have to satisfy certain mathematical
properties. Consider for example the primality test of RSA.
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(c) Controllability – one might need the ability to program any given key in the device.
Consider for example a symmetric key communication with a legacy device. This
requirement supersedes the two previous requirements.
A practical helper data algorithm is an assembly of components rather than a single building
block. One can typically distinguish three consecutive steps, as represented in Figure 2.12.
First, one applies bit selection, to discard the least reliable bits. This alleviates the burden of
the second step: error-correction. An interaction of former steps results in a reasonable failure
rate PFAIL, but the outgoing bits have non-maximum entropy. The third step performs data
compression to increase entropy.
Figure 2.12: Consecutive steps of a helper data algorithm. Typical profiles for failure rate
PFAIL, the number of bits and their total entropy.
Bit selection
The idea of bit selection schemes is to discard the least reliable bits already beforehand. Sta-
tistical investigations on PUFs have revealed, that only a few bad bits cause a large number
of bit errors [60, 38]. This leads to the assumption that there is a lot to gain: if these bits
were removed beforehand, the total bit error probability could be significantly reduced. As a
consequence, one could use more efficient and lightweight error-correcting schemes. Three bit
selection approaches can be identified:
Global Thresholding
Imposing a global threshold for the bit error rate is the most intuitive idea. This has first been
proposed in [61], with employment later-on in [63, 3, 34, 35, 8]. As discussed in [34], the scheme
is highly vulnerable to helper data manipulation.
Local Thresholding Using 1-out-of-n Bits
A local equivalent of global thresholding has been proposed in [63]. Responses are subdivided
in non-overlapping sections of length n. For each section, only the most reliable bit is retained.
Local Thresholding Using Index-Based Syndrome
A variation on 1-out-of-n selection has been proposed in [74], with employment in [76] later-on.
The index-based syndrome (IBS) scheme is able to satisfy the helper data algorithm requirement
3a. The most reliable 0 or 1 within each segment is selected, with equal probability.
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Error-Correction Schemes
Error-correction, also referred to as information reconciliation, ensures the key to be repro-
ducible. Various approaches are applied within the context of PUFs:
Temporal Majority Voting
Majority voting can be performed during reconstruction [3]. However, in contrast to enrolment,
additional IC hardware (counters) is required. Small bit error rates can be successfully sup-
pressed, but large rates stay large. Therefore the method is never sufficient by itself: further
error-correction or prior bit-selection is advised.
Exhaustive Search
The IC could perform an exhaustive search for the error pattern [53]. However, this might
consume too much resources to be practical. The overhead also includes a secure check for
correctness, as a stopping criterion.
Secure Sketch – Code-Offset and Syndrome Construction
Secure sketches, as defined in [18, 17], are the workhorse of most helper data algorithms (HDAs).
They allow for the construction of a fuzzy extractor. Despite the rather generic definition, two
constructions dominate the implementation landscape. Both the code-offset and syndrome con-
struction employ a binary [n, k, t] block code C, with t the error-correcting capability. A variant
of the code-offset construction which allows fulfilling the helper data algorithm requirement 3.a
is [68]. Instead of outputting the error-corrected response, one could also feed it into the entropy
compression hash. Or alternatively m, the message corresponding to the codeword, as it would
require less compression. The syndrome construction requires a linear block code, as it employs
the parity check matrix H. Successful reconstruction is guaranteed for both constructions,
given Hamming weight e ≤ t.
The code-offset construction is employed in [10, 46, 45, 68]. The syndrome construction is
employed in e.g. [47, 62, 69]. BCH codes in particular are very popular: they are implemented in
[47, 76, 62, 75, 69]. Also repetition codes are rather popular, due to their ease of implementation
[10, 45]. The latter is fundamentally different from temporal majority voting, although there is
some similarity for the number of errors they can correct. Other codes have been implemented
as well, such as Reed-Muller [10, 45, 68] and Golay [10, 68].
Codes in Parallel
Very often, it is not feasible to process all response bits with a single code, due to the decoding
complexity [10, 47, 45]. This is resolved by subdividing the PUF response r in x non-overlapping
sections of length n, processed independently by a smaller code. To save area and power,
sections are decoded one-by-one.
Concatenated Codes
Concatenated codes, in the context of PUFs, have first been proposed in [10]. They have also
been adopted in e.g. [47]. They are particularly useful when the average bit error rate is
high. Consider the concatenation of two block codes: [n2, k2, t2] ◦ [n1, k1, t1], with n1 an integer
multiple of k2. Code C2 should be able to correct many errors (a high ratio t2/n2). Repetition
codes in particular are very popular. Code C1 only needs to correct a few errors (a low ratio
t1/n1), but therefore a high k1 to maintain entropy.
Soft-Decision Decoding
Soft-decision decoding, in the context of PUFs, has been introduced conceptually in [46], with
a subsequent implementation in [45]. The error-correcting capabilities improve with respect to
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traditional hard-decision decoding. Less PUF bits are required for the same failure rate and
key length, taking leakage into account. The original proposal comprehends collaboration with
the code-offset method, hereby exposing all bit error rates as public helper data. Note that this
could facilitate modeling attacks, assuming the use of a strong PUF.
Unfortunately, the decoding effort increases significantly. Soft-Decision Maximum-Likelihood
(SDML) decoding offers the best performance, by iterating over all codewords and computing
the likelihood each time. The computational complexity is hence exponential with the code
dimension k. There are faster procedures for some codes at the cost of reduced performance.
Consider Generalized Multiple Concatenated (GMC) codes: one exploits for example the fact
that a large Reed-Muller code can be split recursively in two smaller Reed-Muller codes.
Convolutional Codes
The popularity of block codes does not exclude other possibilities. The use of convolutional
codes has been proposed in [34, 33]. They implement a hard-decision Viterbi algorithm.
Substring Matching
An alternative for error-correcting codes has been proposed in [55]. The basic idea works as
follows. Consider a lengthy string of PUF bits r. During enrollment, a shorter substring rSUB
is selected at random, possibly considering r to be circular, and exposed as public helper data.
Former selection procedure is repeated for several strings: substring indices are combined to
obtain a key k of sufficient length. During reconstruction, substrings are shifted along newly
generated strings r˜. The correct indices are retrieved via their low Hamming distance. The
scheme is able to fulfill helper data algorithm requirement 3a and possibly also requirements
3b and 3c if substring indices are simply concatenated to form the key.
Data Compression
The entropy of the PUF response r is non-maximum because of two reasons. First, the cor-
relations and bias of the PUF. Second, additional entropy loss by the helper data algorithm,
referred to as leakage. Indeed, helper data unavoidably leaks information about the PUF re-
sponse. A compression step ensures the key k to be nearly uniform. This step is also referred
to as privacy amplification. The total amount of entropy is preserved, but the bit-average in-
creases by having more input than output bits. A hash function is the well-established solution.
One computes k = Hash(r).
2.2.4 Discussion
The quality of the statistical evaluation of a PUF is significantly limited by the number of
available devices: several million devices would be needed for reliable statistical evaluation.
This means that no work published on PUFs provides a sufficiently large statistical evaluation
of PUFs, so designers cannot take results in the literature seriously. This could have disastrous
security and economic consequence in the future.
Moreover efforts towards standardization of PUFs are just starting. The reason is similar as
for TRNGs: PUFs rely not only on the principle, but also on its physical implementation in
selected technology. Moreover, no standard methodology for evaluation of PUFs (like AIS 31
for TRNGs) was proposed up to now.
Another important problem of PUF evaluation is aging. Usually, designers use aging models
that were developed in a very different context and very often (if not always!) aging simulation
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results differ seriously from practical experience.
It is however already an important step forward, that PUF technology has been taken up in
the discussions about an ISO standard – ISO/IEC NP 20897: “Security Requirements and Test
Methods for Physically Unclonable Functions for Generating Non-Stored Security Parameters.”
During the ISO meeting in Malaysia on 4th - 8th May 2015, at least five countries cast a
positive vote (ISO stage: 10.20) to initiate officially a so-called Working Draft (WD) process.
The project is now in the approved -stage (10.99) since 2015/09 and is now waiting to be
registered in TC/SC work programme (20.00). The scope of the ISO working draft document
will include the applications descriptions (weak vs. strong PUFs), the reliability testing, security
measurements and security levels. The first Committee Draft is supposed to be available by
2016/10 and should be published and adopted by 2017/10. The main editors of the documents
are Sylvain Guilley (Te´le´com Paris Tech, France) and Soshi Hamaguchi (Cosmos, Japan).
2.2.5 Conclusion
It is clear that unlike algorithmic cryptographic primitives, and similarly to TRNGs, PUF
principles cannot be standardized. However, it could be very useful if several principles that
are easier to characterize could be pre-selected and some convenient stochastic models and
physical characterization of the source of randomness developed for them. The role of the
designer would then be as follows:
1. Depending on performance and security requirements, implement one PUF principle in
selected technology.
2. Evaluate the amount of randomness in the given technology by quantification of the
physical source of entropy such as the CMOS process variations.
3. Using the measured parameter, estimate the entropy per bit of the raw binary response
using existing stochastic model of the PUF and select suitable entropy extraction and
algorithmic post-processing methods.
4. Depending on the stochastic model of the source of randomness, entropy extraction and
post-processing algorithm selection, estimate the entropy per bit (pattern) at the PUF
output.
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Chapter 3
HECTOR Requirements on Key
Generators and Selection Criteria
As explained in the previous chapters, the HECTOR project considers TRNGs and PUFs
mainly as generators of confidential keys, for which the security requirements are the most
restrictive. In the first phase of the project, the industrial partners discussed and specified
requirements for TRNGs and PUF that should be selected and evaluated. Next, all HECTOR
partners discussed and specified selection criteria, which should be considered in the selection
process.
3.1 HECTOR Requirements on TRNGs and PUFs
Although the applications of both RNGs and PUFs in cryptography and data security can be
similar, their principles are very different. We recall that the first one uses dynamic sources
of randomness during device operation and the second one uses randomness coming from the
uncertainty appearing only during the device production process. Consequently, the HECTOR
requirements on TRNGs and PUFs are different and will be analyzed separately.
3.1.1 Requirements on TRNGs
Since one of the most important requirements claimed by HECTOR industrial partners is the
evaluability and thus certifiability of the selected TRNG according to AIS 20/31, the HECTOR
project will deal with the TRNGs, which:
• are based on a physical principle for which a comprehensible stochastic model is feasible,
• have an internally quantifiable physical source of randomness that represents one of the
main input parameters of the stochastic model,
• have the raw random signal (digital noise) available for online and oﬄine testing,
• could be tested using fast and efficient dedicated statistical tests based on the stochastic
model (total failure test, online test and startup test) in order to detect entropy loss due
to some attack or variation of operational conditions and aging.
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Other priority requirements on TRNGs specified by industrial partners in WP1 are compatibil-
ity with industrialization and manufacturing constraints, portability, and in the case of ASICs
compatibility with digital design constraints.
3.1.2 Requirements on PUFs
According to HECTOR industrial partners, the selected PUF must fulfill following require-
ments:
• must have sufficient uniqueness, steadiness and randomness in corner conditions,
• must be based on a comprehensible physical principle, the feasibility of a stochastic model
for the selected PUF principle would be a clear advantage,
• should be robust against environmental fluctuations, aging and attacks.
As in the case of TRNGs, other priority requirements on PUFs specified by industrial partners
in WP1 are compatibility with industrialization and manufacturing constraints and portability.
3.2 Selection Criteria for TRNGs
3.2.1 Technology Criteria
Feasibility in FPGA and ASICs
Some generator principles can exploit logic elements or need interconnection resources, which
are not available in certain technologies, either in FPGA technologies or in ASIC technologies
or in both. The generator, which will be finally selected for implementation in FPGAs, should
be feasible in all available families and if possible, also in future FPGA families. Similarly,
the generator selected for implementation in ASIC should be feasible independently from the
technology.
Repeatability and Portability
Repeatability of the design means that the design of the generator can be copied from one de-
vice to another, while giving the results having the same statistical properties. In other words,
outputs of two identical devices will give the same statistical results. In practical industrial
applications, the repeatability is a must. Repeatability is also tightly linked with industrializa-
tion requirements and constraints since repeatability should be achievable without individual
trimming, and shouldn’t impact production yields.
Portability means that one TRNG design can be easily ported from one technology to another.
Nevertheless, some manual intervention concerning placement and routing during the design
phase is acceptable.
In case of HECTOR TRNGs for ASICs, the portability criteria translate into easy integration
into digital ASIC design flows. For design reuse and complexity management purposes, digital
ASICs products are never full custom designs: they are designed using standard digital design
flows, EDA tools and pre-qualified digital IPs. These IPs are synthesized using standard and
pre-qualified digital standard cell libraries. Some critical or analog IPs can also be sourced
as hard macros. Designing, characterizing and qualifying hard macro IPs is a heavy process,
that needs to be repeated for every target silicon technology. An important portability criteria
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for HECTOR ASIC security IPs is the possibility to synthesize them using standard digital
libraries using standard digital design flows and not requiring the design of technology-specific
hard macros. In case the TRNG principle requires tight control over topology or timings, it
should be possible to impose such constraints through tools available in standard digital design
flows.
Scalability
The scalability represents the possibility to easily adapt (for example by the use of some param-
eter) the design of the generator to the application needs. This concerns especially the area,
the bit rate and eventually the power consumption, too.
3.2.2 Design Criteria
Output Data Rate
The output data rate depends usually on the number of bits per sample and on the sampling
frequency. Besides the value of the speed, another important feature is its regularity: the data
rate of some generators can vary in time.
Cost – Area and Patents Pending
The cost of the generator is expressed in number of logic resources needed (equivalent logic
gates in ASIC or logic cells in FPGAs). Another important factor, which determines the cost
of the solution are license fees because of patent protection.
Power and Energy Consumption
Power consumption is determined by the current delivered by the power supply at given voltage
at given instant. Energy consumption can be obtained from the power consumption by its
integration over time. Energy consumption of a fast generator can be reduced by stopping the
generator when random data are not needed.
3.2.3 Security Criteria
Evaluability According to AIS31
Before products will be applied in real-life, their design and performance has to be evaluated.
This is usually done by independent security laboratories. These labs will verify the performance
according to the claimed security class. AIS31 provides methods that allow objective testing
of the RNG output. Besides this performance criterion, the evaluation lab will also verify the
design of the RNG. This should also match the claimed criteria. Depending on the selected
class, the stochastic model should provide clues on the source of randomness, its performance
and on dependencies on implementation choices and environmental conditions.
Security evaluations can be costly and time-consuming. It is therefore important for the
industry to reduce the time and effort related to conformance with the security standard and
security testing. To achieve such goal, designers are encouraged to make RNG designs not
’overly complicated’. A design, which is made following the guidelines of the standard and
which is simple to understand, is usually also easy to describe (stochastic model) and to evaluate.
This increases the ’evaluability’ of the design, which finally reflects on a product with higher
assurance that the product meets its claims, while offering lower costs and faster time-to-market.
The evaluability of the generator is related to its complexity and possibility to specify the
true source of randomness, which can be quantified (measured) inside the device. In addition,
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a class has to be specified for the RNG, which depends on the final use-case of the product.
In general, this may be a class specified by AIS31. Depending on the claimed class, different
implementations are allowed. The differences between the classes come from the type of the
generator and from the extent to which the RNG output quality is internally tested. Different
strategies should be applicable to test generated raw random numbers and internal random
numbers (the output of the post-processing block). The raw random numbers must be available
(in the test mode) outside the generator. The entropy harvesting mechanism (e.g. the sampler)
and the post-processing function must be testable. The embedded tests themselves must be
testable, too.
Availability or Feasibility of the Model
In the best case, the stochastic model for the given generator already exists. If it is not the case,
it is important that the model is at least feasible. This means in particular, that the generator
should not mix in some inseparable manner the true randomness and the pseudo-randomness,
since the pseudo-randomness could prevent the possibility to characterize the true randomness.
The stochastic model should be robust, i.e. independent from variations of parameters other
than sources of randomness.
Testability
The testability of the generator means that internal signals should be available for testing. The
full testability means that without the presence of randomness, these internal signals would
have some constant value (zero or one), which is easy to detect by the total entropy failure test.
Robustness
The generator should be as robust as possible to variation of environmental conditions (such as
temperature and power supply voltage) and to active attacks (for example by electromagnetic
induction).
3.3 Selection Criteria for PUFs
3.3.1 Technology Criteria
Feasibility in FPGA and ASICs
Some PUF principles could make use of logic elements or need interconnection resources that
are not available in certain technologies, either in FPGAs or in ASICs or in both. The PUF that
will be finally selected for implementation in FPGAs, should be feasible in all available families
and if possible, also in future FPGA families. Similarly, the PUF selected for implementation
in ASIC should be feasible in ASIC independently from the technology.
Repeatability and Portability
Repeatability of the design means that the design of the PUF can be copied from one device
to another, while given results have the same statistical properties. In practical industrial
applications, the repeatability is a must.
Portability means that one PUF principle can be easily ported from one technology to an-
other. Nevertheless, some manual intervention concerning placement and routing during the
design phase is acceptable.
Scalability
The scalability represents the possibility to easily adapt (for example by the use of some pa-
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rameter) the design of the PUF to the application needs. This concerns especially the area, the
number of returned bits per challenge and eventually the power consumption, too.
3.3.2 Design Criteria
Number of Returned Bits per Challenge
When queried with a challenge, the PUF will produce a response. The raw bit length of this
response determines the number of bits that can be generated per challenge.
Cost – Area and Patents Pending
The cost of the PUF is expressed in the number of logic resources needed (equivalent logic gates
in ASIC or logic cells in FPGAs). Another important factor, which determines the cost of the
solution are license fees because of patent protection.
Power and Energy Consumption
Power consumption is determined by the current delivered by the power supply at given instant
and given voltage. Energy consumption can be obtained from the power consumption by its
integration over time. Energy consumption of an efficient PUF can be reduced by stopping the
PUF when data are not needed.
3.3.3 Quality Criteria
Uniqueness
The uniqueness of the PUF is sometimes also denoted as the inter-device variation. This param-
eter shows to what extent the responses generated by the PUF in different devices are unique,
i.e. whether the response, based on its unique physical characteristics, is non-reproducible on
different devices.
Steadiness
The steadiness of the PUF is sometimes also denoted as the intra-device variation or reliability.
This parameter quantifies the changes at the output of a PUF function over many measure-
ments with environmental changes (i.e. temperature variation, VDD variation). The metric for
steadiness is the bit error probability.
Randomness (entropy rate)
The response of the PUF should be uniformly distributed and unpredictable. The entropy per
response bit of the PUF is defined as the entropy rate.
3.3.4 Security Criteria
Feasibility (availability) of the model
A stochastic model of the PUF describes physical processes, which determine the PUF response.
Such a model allows to study the PUF behavior in full detail, including average and worst case
bit error probabilities, and is an invaluable tool for designing more efficient and better adapted
PUFs and PUF-based systems.
Robustness against attacks
As any other security building block, PUFs could be vulnerable to attacks. Some design choices
could facilitate certain categories of attacks: passive attacks like side-channel attacks or active
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attacks like fault injection using EMA. In case of strong PUFs, modeling attacks need to be
considered as well.
3.4 Conclusions on TRNGs and PUFs Selection Criteria
All the requirements presented in this chapter have different priority depending on the targeted
application. For example, for light-weight cryptography applications, the area and possibly
power consumption will take priority before the speed and security. Nevertheless, for practical
reasons, the repeatability of the design will always be required.
In the following phase of the HECTOR project, some marking (score) of the selected charac-
teristics should be proposed (e.g. from 0 to 10 as the lowest and the highest quality level), and
finally, in the process of the final selection, different weights will be attributed to individual
characteristics according to the targeted application. The principle, which will obtain the best
score will be selected as the best candidate.
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Chapter 4
Selected TRNG Principles
According to the HECTOR project objectives, at least one TRNG which is suitable for imple-
mentation in ASICs and at least one that is suitable for FPGAs should be preselected. The
preselected principles must fulfill all TRNG security criteria described in Chapter 3. Follow-
ing the HECTOR’s planning, the preselected TRNG principles should then be further studied,
enhanced and hardened.
Currently, only jittery clock signals and random initialization of the flip-flops (or of the RAM
memory bits) seem to be sources of randomness that can be easily exploited in logic devices.
Since the jitter of the clock signal is easier to quantify1, we preselected the following TRNG
principles based on jittery clock signals in Task 2.1:
• Elementary Oscillator-based TRNG (ELO-TRNG)
• Coherent Sampling Oscillator-based TRNG (COSO-TRNG)
• Delay Chain-based TRNG (DC-TRNG)
• Transition Effect RO-based TRNG (TERO-TRNG)
• PLL-based TRNG (PLL-TRNG)
• Self-Timed Ring-based TRNG (STR-TRNG)
These TRNGs will next be analyzed from the point of view of the criteria defined in Sec. 3.2.
4.1 Elementary Oscillator-Based TRNG
4.1.1 Principle and Design
The elementary oscillator based TRNG (ELO-TRNG) is a physical TRNG (P-TRNG) similar
to the one proposed by Fairfield et al. in 1985 [23]. Its structure is very simple (see Fig. 4.1):
the ELO-TRNG consists of two free running oscillators, a counter and a D flip-flop as a sampler.
The output of one ring oscillator is periodically sampled by a D flip-flop. The sampling
period lasts K periods of the reference clock signal generated by the second ring oscillator.
The ELO-TRNG was thoroughly analyzed by Baudet et al. in [5], and the authors proposed
a stochastic model which can be used to determine the entropy rate at the ELO-TRNG output.
1Note that the quantification of the source of randomness is intended to be used as a basis for the efficient
dedicated statistical tests.
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Figure 4.1: Elementary oscillator based TRNG
The model relies on exploitation of thermal noise. It is based on observations and on charac-
terization of the thermal noise in the frequency domain. Therefore, it is easy to understand
and simple to use.
The main advantage of the ELO-TRNG is that it is very simple to implement in logic devices.
Since it only contains two ring oscillators, their placement and routing is easier and can be done
in such a way that the mutual influence of the rings, which creates autocorrelations in the RNG
output signal, is reduced to a minimum. It is also easy to detect mutual locking of the two
rings, which would have catastrophic consequences for security, as the entropy rate at the output
would drop to zero.
The main disadvantage of the ELO-TRNG is its low output bit rate. Depending on the
model, the entropy rate at the output of the generator required by security standards comes
from the thermal noise. Because the jitter originating from the thermal noise is very small
(only few ps), it has to accumulate for a very long time: several hundred thousand periods of
the jittery clock signal are necessary [29]. The output bit rate is thus in the order of few kbits
per second.
4.1.2 Evaluation According to the Technology Criteria
Feasibility in FPGA and ASICs
The ELO-TRNG is easy to implement in both FPGAs and ASICs. The free-running oscillators
can be implemented as ring oscillators based on simple inverters. Depending on the frequency
of the reference clock (the output clock of Oscillator 2 in Fig. 4.1), the frequency divider can be
implemented as an asynchronous or a synchronous counter. Both are very easy to implement
in logic devices using standard gates and logic elements. The same is valid for the D flip-flop
used as a sampler.
The main difficulty is related to the correlation between oscillators. It is caused mainly by
cross-talks. The correlation between oscillators can be reduced by an appropriate topology
of this part of the generator. Of course, the designer using ASIC technology has much more
freedom when creating the TRNG topology than the designer working with FPGAs. Namely,
long parallel wires, which build up interconnection signals in FPGAs are susceptible to create
unwanted cross-talks.
Repeatability and Portability
The ELO-TRNG has perfectly repeatable design, i.e. all the generators having the same topol-
ogy (structure, placement and routing) will generate numbers having the same statistical quality
in all devices having the same hardware (i.e. the same technology of ASIC or the same device
in FPGAs).
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The ELO-TRNG is potentially portable, however, the size of the oscillators (the frequency)
and of the counter (number of bits) must be adapted to the selected technology.
Scalability
As the name of the generator indicates, the elementary oscillator based TRNG has extremely
small area requirements. It is therefore (by definition) not scalable. Nevertheless, the output bit
rate can be increased by merging several elementary generators into one higher speed generator.
However, possible correlations between oscillators implemented in the same device must be
taken into account.
4.1.3 Evaluation According to the Design Criteria
Output Bit Rate
The output bit rate of the generator depends on security requirements, namely on required
entropy rate. For a smaller accepted entropy rate, the division factor K from Fig. 4.1 can be
significantly decreased and the bit rate can become much higher. However, for high entropy
rates (e.g. those required by AIS20/31) the bit rate is limited to several kbits per second.
Cost – Area and Patents Pending
The ELO-TRNG itself is extremely small (of course, at the cost of the bit rate) and, as far as
we know, no patent is pending.
Power and Energy Consumption
The energy and power consumption of the ELO-TRNG seems to be relatively small, but re-
garding the bit rate, the energy spent per generation of one bit could be considerable, because
long jitter accumulation periods are necessary (division factor K is very high). The energy and
power consumption depends on technology and namely on the size of the jitter – higher jitter
needs smaller accumulation times.
4.1.4 Evaluation According to the Security Criteria
Evaluability According to AIS31
The design of the ELO-TRNG is extremely simple and therefore, impact of each element of
the generator (e.g. the source of randomness, the randomness harvesting mechanism, etc.) can
be easily inspected and the stochastic model can be easily validated during the certification
process.
Availability or Feasibility of the Model
A comprehensible stochastic model is already available [5]. The main difficulty of the model is
related to the fact that it supposes that the randomness comes only from the thermal noise.
Therefore, the impact of the flicker noise on the global noise must not be taken into account in
estimation of randomness.
The robustness of the model is related to the ability of separate the impact of the thermal
noise from that of the flicker noise, since the model is based on the size of the jitter coming
from the thermal noise. The locking of the two ring oscillators is another critical point that
can decrease the entropy rate.
Testability
The generator is testable using the proposed stochastic model [5]. The tests based on the
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embedded measurement of the jitter coming from the thermal noise (the noise that is used as a
source of randomness) was recently published [29]. Nevertheless, the cost of the tests is much
higher than that of the generator itself. Some efficient and less expensive tests would be useful.
The tests must be also able to detect locking of the oscillators.
Robustness
Free running oscillators in general and ring oscillators in particular are known to be very
sensitive to variations of operational conditions. The generator uses differential principle: the
two oscillators are influenced by the global environmental conditions in the same way and the
global changes in both oscillators mutually cancel each other. It is therefore very robust to
variations of the operational conditions.
4.2 Coherent Sampling Oscillator-Based TRNG
4.2.1 Principle and Design
The coherent sampling oscillator based TRNG (COSO-TRNG) is a P-TRNG similar to that
presented in the previous section (see Fig. 4.2): it uses two oscillators as the sources of jittery
clock signals, a D flip-flop and a counter, which counts number of the reference clock periods
during one sampling period (the beat signal at the output of the D flip-flop). It was first
presented in [40], where the n-bit counter from Fig. 4.2 was replaced by a simple T flip-flop
(1-bit counter).
Oscillator 1
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 clk
n-bit counters1
Raw random 
numbers
Beat 
signal
Oscillator 2
reset
clk
output
s2
s3
Register
input
clk
output
n
12 11 10 11
s1
s2
s3
s4
s4
T1
T2
Figure 4.2: Coherent sampling oscillator based TRNG and its waveforms
The main difference between ELO-TRNG and COSO-TRNG is in the way the sampling
period is generated. Contrary to the ELO-TRNG, in which the sampling period is derived from
K periods of the reference clock, in the COSO-TRNG, the sampling period depends on the
absolute value of the difference in periods of the two clocks ∆T = |T1 − T2|. Note that in the
coherent sampling, a periodic signal is sampled in such a way that an integer number of its cycles
fits into a predefined sampling window. This is exactly what happens in the COSO-TRNG.
Since both s1 and s2 are jittery clock signals, their periods, and also the difference in periods
vary dynamically in time. Consequently, the sampling period varies too and so does the number
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of the reference clock periods. For simplicity, let us assume that the periods T1 and T2 remain
constant during the measurement interval (one sampling period). The counter value would be
as follows:
N =
⌈
T1
∆T
⌉
. (4.1)
The sensitivity of the generator to the jitter depends on the difference in periods ∆T . This
difference must be smaller than the jitter in order to make N vary in time (otherwise the
output of the generator will stall at a constant value). Smaller the ∆T , higher the entropy in
the counter value, but at the same time, smaller the sample rate at the output of the generator.
4.2.2 Evaluation According to the Technology Criteria
Feasibility in FPGA and ASICs
Although the logic structure of the COSO-TRNG is easy to implement in both FPGAs and
ASICs (it is practically the same as that of the ELO-TRNG), the main difficulty is in obtaining
sufficiently small difference in periods T1 and T2 (∆T ). Recall that the jitter size obtained
commonly in free running oscillators is in the order of picoseconds and that by definition, the
precision of setting up the difference in periods must be higher. This is not an easy task neither
in ASICs nor in FPGAs.
Repeatability and Portability
Our experience shows that even if the difference in periods was sufficiently small in one device,
another identical device could have very different value of ∆T and could output very weak ran-
dom numbers (if any). Consequently, the COSO-TRNG itself does not seem to have repeatable
design. One possible solution would be to set up dynamically the difference in periods.
The COSO-TRNG design is potentially portable, however, the size of the oscillators (the
frequency) and of the counter (number of bits) must be adapted to the selected technology and
of course the problem related to the repeatability must be solved.
Scalability
Similarly to the ELO-TRNG, the COSO-TRNG has extremely small area requirements. It
is therefore (by definition) not scalable. Nevertheless, the output bit rate can be increased
by merging several such generators into one higher speed generator if the correlation between
different oscillators is taken into account.
4.2.3 Evaluation According to the Design Criteria
Output Bit Rate
The output bit rate of the generator depends on security requirements, namely on required
entropy rate. For smaller accepted entropy rates, the difference in periods (∆T ) can be larger,
causing the bit rate to increase (at the cost of decreasing entropy). For high entropy rates (e.g.
those required by AIS20/31), the bit rate is limited to several tens of kbits per second. However,
because of the principle of the generator (the sampling period depends on the difference in
periods, which changes dynamically), its output bit rate is not regular.
Cost – Area and Patents Pending
The COSO-TRNG itself is extremely small (of course, at the cost of the bit rate). It will be
necessary to verify if any patent is pending.
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Power and Energy Consumption
The energy and power consumption of the COSO-TRNG seems to be relatively small, but
regarding the bit rate, the energy spent per generation of one bit could be considerable, because
long jitter accumulation periods are necessary (difference in periods must be small). The energy
and power consumption depends on technology and namely on the size of the jitter – higher
jitter needs smaller ∆T .
4.2.4 Evaluation According to the Security Criteria
Evaluability According to AIS31
The design of the COSO-TRNG is extremely simple and therefore, the impact of each element
of the generator (e.g. the source of randomness, the randomness harvesting mechanism, etc.)
can be easily inspected and the stochastic model can be easily validated during the certification
process.
Availability or Feasibility of the Model
A stochastic model of the COSO-TRNG has not been published, yet. However, the model of
the ELO-TRNG could probably be applied. Because of the coherent sampling principle, it is
possible that some simpler model could also be feasible. Both solutions should be inspected
during the HECTOR project.
Testability
The generator is testable. Namely, the counter output can be utilized to characterise the jitter.
However, the tests must be also able to detect locking of the oscillators. Because of the closeness
of oscillator frequencies, the locking of the two oscillators (causing significant entropy failure)
is menacing. Fortunately, it can be easily detected.
Robustness
Free running oscillators in general and ring oscillators in particular are known to be very
sensitive to variations of operational conditions. However, since the generator uses a differential
principle, in which the two oscillators are influenced by the global environmental conditions in
the same way, the global changes in both oscillators mutually cancel each other. The COSO-
TRNG is therefore very robust to variations in the operational conditions.
4.3 PLL-Based TRNG
4.3.1 Principle and Design
The TRNG based on the jitter, which is introduced by the phase-locked loop (PLL), was first
proposed in [28]. The PLL-based TRNG (PLL-TRNG) uses the coherent sampling method for
generating random bit stream.
The basic version of the PLL-TRNG is depicted in Fig. 4.3. Thanks to the control loop of
the PLL, the frequency of the output clock signal (clkjit) depends on the frequency of the PLL
input clock signal (clkref ) in the following way:
fclkjit = fclkref ·
KM
KD
, (4.2)
where KM and KD are multiplication and division factors of the PLL, respectively.
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Figure 4.3: Phase-locked loop-based TRNG (PLL-TRNG)
In the PLL-TRNG, the jittery clock signal (clkjit) is sampled in a D flip-flop (D-FF) using
the reference clock signal (clkref ) and the output of the flip-flop is decimated in the decimator,
in which KD samples (outputs of the D-FF) are added modulo 2 to form one random bit at the
output of the generator.
The source of randomness in the PLL-TRNG is the tracking jitter of the PLL, i.e. the
difference in phases of the reference clock and the PLL output clock. Because of the PLL
principle, the tracking jitter is bounded and it depends on the jitter of the reference clock and
the parameters of the PLL (the jitter of the voltage-controlled oscillator, the bandwidth of the
filter and the dumping factor) [21].
Figure 4.4 depicts an example of input/output waveforms of the PLL-TRNG, in which the
multiplication factor KM = 5 and the division factor KD = 7. It can be observed that the
rising edges of the reference clock signal can be situated in seven positions during one period
TQ = KDTclkref = KMTclkjit . In two of them, the rising edges of the signal clkref appear when
the sampled signal is equal to zero (samples 5 and 6 situated in the second half of the sampled
clock). At the moment when two rising edges occur, the sampled signal is equal to one (samples
1 and 2) and finally at three other rising edges the sample value is uncertain (samples 0, 3, and
4).
  Period TQ : KD sampling positions in TQ AND in Tjit 
   clkjit  = clkref 
KM
 KD
   clkjit
   clkref
   q
5
PLL guarantees the frequency 
relationship:
7
0 1 23 45 6 0
Figure 4.4: Example of the PLL-TRNG input/output waveforms
It was shown in [28] that if the standard deviation of the jitter (σjit) fulfills the following
condition:
σjit > MAX(∆Tmin), (4.3)
at least one sample during each TQ period will have some random value. The term MAX(∆Tmin)
in condition (4.3) represents the worst case distance between the rising edges of the clock signal
clkref and rising or falling edges of clkjit during the period TQ. It is given by
MAX(∆Tmin) =
TCLK
4KM
GCD(2KM , KD) =
TCLJ
4KD
GCD(2KM , KD), (4.4)
where GCD means the Greatest Common Divisor.
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As shown in [28], if KM and KD are relatively prime and KD is odd, the TRNG output bit
rate is R = T−1Q = fref/KD and the sensitivity to jitter is S = ∆
−1 = KD/Tjit. The output bit
rate and the sensitivity are closely related. Following relationships between parameters of the
PLL-TRNG can be observed:
• to increase R and S, fref should be as high as possible,
• to increase R, KD should be as small as possible,
• to increase S, KM should be as large as possible.
In some technologies, condition (4.3) cannot be fulfilled using a single PLL. In this case, two
PLLs connected in series or in parallel can be used to increase the bit rate and sensitivity to
jitter by increasing the multiplication and division factors (see the top panel and the bottom
panel in Fig. 4.5, respectively).
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            Q
 clk
Decimator
(XOR-ing KD samples)
   clkin    clkjit
   clkref
   clkjit  = clkref 
KM
 KD
   D-FF
TRNG
outD
            Q
 clk
Decimator
(XOR-ing KD samples)
   clkin PLL1 PLL2
PLL1
PLL2
   clkjit
   clkref
   KM  = KM1   KM2  
   KD  = KD1    KD2  
   KM  = KM1    KD2  
   KD  = KD1    KM2  
Figure 4.5: PLL-TRNG using two PLLs in series or in parallel
4.3.2 Evaluation According to the Technology Criteria
Feasibility in FPGA and ASICs
The PLL-TRNG is more suitable for implementation in FPGAs, because PLLs are freely avail-
able. It is feasible also in ASICs, but it is considered to be expensive because of the use of
dedicated PLLs. The disadvantage of the PLL-TRNG implementation in FPGAs is that the
PLL characteristics are defined by the FPGA vendor and that they can be modified only in
a limited extent (mostly only KM and KD, sometimes also filter parameters). On the other
hand, its important advantage is that the PLLs have separate power supply wires in FPGAs.
Repeatability and Portability
The portability of the design is limited by the size of the jitter in relationship with the maximum
possible values of the multiplication and division factors. The design of the generator (the
choice of KM and KD and the decimator) must be adapted to these characteristics given by the
technology and the PLL structure and topology. The design does not need manual placement
and routing. Once designed for the given technology, the generator is freely repeatable.
Scalability
The TRNG design is not scalable – more PLLs would be needed.
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4.3.3 Evaluation According to the Design Criteria
Output Bit Rate
The output bit rate depends largely on the tracking jitter that is not known in advance (it
depends on the technology and the structure and topology of the PLL). It depends also on the
multiplication and division factors in relationship with the jitter. Depending on technology,
output bit rates up to 1.5 Mbits/s can be expected.
Cost – Area and Patents Pending
The TRNG area is determined by the PLL. The area of the additional logic is negligible (one
D-FF, the counter of KD periods and an accumulator with the XOR gate). The TRNG is not
patented.
Power and Energy Consumption
The energy and power consumption is technology dependent, but it is relatively high because
of the PLL (the VCO oscillates at high frequency). In some FPGAs, the PLLs can be stopped,
when the TRNG is not in use.
4.3.4 Evaluation According to the Security Criteria
Evaluability According to AIS31
The principle is very simple and clear. The source of randomness is clearly defined and can be
easily quantified inside the device. The raw binary signal is available. The TRNG should be
easy to evaluate.
Availability or Feasibility of the Model
Simple stochastic model of the PLL-TRNG was published in [7]. However, the model does not
take into account the correlation between successive samples. This correlation can be impacted
by the dumping factor of the PLL. Extensions of the existing model should be feasible.
Testability
The raw binary signal is available and testable (it does not contain a pseudo-randomness, if
the TQ is set properly). Based on the coherent sampling principle, the tracking jitter, which
is used as the source of randomness, can be quantified inside the chip. The embedded jitter
measurement can constitute a basis for dedicated online statistical tests, which can be embedded
inside the device.
Robustness
Because of the control loop of the PLL, the generator is very robust to environmental changes.
The PLL is often physically isolated from the rest of the device, which contributes to the
robustness.
4.4 Delay Chain-Based TRNG
4.4.1 Principle and Design
The delay chain based TRNG (DC-TRNG) proposed by Rozˇic´ et. al. [58] is shown in Fig-
ure 4.6. This TRNG uses a free running ring oscillator as the source of entropy. The phase
of the ring-oscillator (the position of the signal edge) is affected by the white noise. After
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the jitter accumulates for a short time, the position of the edge becomes unpredictable due to
the accumulated Gaussian jitter. This position is sampled with high precision using tapped
delay lines. These tapped delay lines are made using carry-chain primitives available on most
commercial FPGAs. These primitives are designed to be ultra-fast which makes them suitable
for high-precision time-to-digital conversion. Data sampled in the delay lines are encoded using
XOR gates and a priority encoder to detect the position of the signal edge. The neighboring
positions are mapped into different output bit values.
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Figure 4.6: True random number generator based on the Delay Chain
There are four main advantages of this TRNG:
1. low cost – compact implementation using less than 70 slices,
2. high throughput of more than 10 Mb/s,
3. high portability between FPGAs,
4. low design expertise required.
The main disadvantage of this TRNG is related to its implementation aspects. Only slices
with carry-chain primitives can be utilized to implement the tapped delay lines. For example,
on Xilinx Spartan-6, only one half of the slices contain this primitive. However, the FPGA
fabric available on Xilinx Zynq-7000 SoC contains carry-chain primitives in every slice.
4.4.2 Evaluation According to the Technology Criteria
Feasibility in FPGA and ASICs
The design is feasible on all FPGAs containing dedicated carry-chain primitives. These primi-
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tives are provided by all popular FPGAs vendors. Up to now, this design has only been imple-
mented in FPGAs. However the underlying principle can be used for TRNG implementation
in ASIC.
Repeatability and Portability
The design of the DC-TRNG is well repeatable. Practical experiments show that the quality
of the output doesn’t vary significantly across different devices of the same family.
The design is portable to any FPGA with carry-chain primitives. Only few platform pa-
rameters such as the oscillator period, the jitter strength and the propagation delay of the
carry-chain need to be determined once for each FPGA family. The architecture and the place-
ment strategy remain the same across different platforms. This design only requires placement
constraints to be defined, no routing constraints are required.
Scalability
Design duplication is possible due to its compact implementation and availability of used prim-
itives (LUTs and carry-chains).
4.4.3 Evaluation According to the Design Criteria
Output Bit Rate
The output bit rate depends on the platform and design parameters. For Spartan-6, 2 versions
were implemented and the throughput of 1.53 Mb/s and 14.3 Mb/s was achieved after the
post-processing using a parity filter. Possibly, better throughput could be achieved by using
better post-processing techniques. Better results are also expected on newer platforms.
Cost – Area and Patents Pending
This design has very compact implementation. Two versions of 40 and 67 slices including the
entropy source and post-processing were implemented.
Currently, there are no patents pending on this design.
Power and Energy Consumption
Currently, this design is implemented only in FPGAs. So power and energy consumption is not
relevant.
4.4.4 Evaluation According to the Security Criteria
Evaluability According to AIS31
This TRNG relies on the accumulated jitter in a free-running ring-oscillator. The process of
jitter accumulation in ring-oscillators is well known.
Availability or Feasibility of the Model
The first version of the stochastic model is available in the paper describing the original design
[58]. A lower bound of entropy can be computed from the jitter parameters. A more detailed
version of the model is in preparation by the KUL partner.
Testability
The raw binary signal of this TRNG is available for testing. A dedicated test based on the
online jitter measurements is also in preparation.
Robustness
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The design parameters can have margins to improve robustness at the cost of reduced through-
put.
4.5 Transition Effect RO-Based TRNG
4.5.1 Principle and Design
The P-TRNG based on the TERO structure (TERO-TRNG) proposed by Varchola and Dru-
tarovsky in 2010 [71] is depicted in Fig. 4.7. In this design, the TERO circuitry generating a
random number of temporary oscillations is completed by an n-bit asynchronous counter which
counts the rising edges of the oscillating signal. The counter output represents realizations of
the random variable, i.e. the number of oscillations in subsequent control periods. Because
of the temporary nature of oscillations, TERO must be periodically restarted by the control
signal. The control period defines the output bit rate of the generator.
Counter of rising edges
clk
reset
cnt[7:0]
Digital 
noise
Request of 
a random bit
. . .
. . .
cnt[0]
Counter
output
Figure 4.7: True random number generator based on the TERO structure
The random binary sequence is obtained by successively concatenating the least significant
bits of the counter, i.e. only one T flip-flop is needed in the counter (the n bit counter is
only needed for the characterization of the generator, or alternatively, it can be used to build
embedded randomness tests).
The main advantage of the TERO-TRNG is its simple structure (especially if only a T flip
flop is used instead of an n bit counter) and its high output bit rate – several megabits per
second can be obtained. The main weakness of this design is related to its repeatability.
We stress that the mean number of oscillations is a function of the TERO intern al structure
and parameters. Unfortunately, TERO behavior is very sensitive to variations in the production
process and several TEROs with identical topology could feature a very different number of
oscillations.
As shown by Haddad et al. in [30], the entropy rate in the generated bit stream is closely
linked to the number of oscillations. In order to accumulate enough entropy, a sufficient number
of oscillations defined by the stochastic model must occur after each restart.
Two negative events can occur: 1) because of internal parameters of the TERO circuitry,
the oscillator does not oscillate for a sufficiently long time; 2) the TERO is too symmetrical
and the oscillations last longer than the control period and consequently, number of oscillation
periods is not random. In both cases, the entropy rate at the output of a given TERO-TRNG
would be insufficient.
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It thus seems that TERO-TRNGs are better suited for ASICs, because their internal param-
eters can be better adjusted. Although such a TRNG design is globally very attractive, the
question if its ASIC implementation can be tuned to be robust against normal manufacturing
variations while maintaining enough entropy remains open. Actual implementations in ASIC
technology are needed and planned, since FPGA implementations are not sufficient to evaluate
this feature of the design.
4.5.2 Evaluation According to the Technology Criteria
Feasibility in FPGA and ASICs
The TERO-TRNG has logic elements that are easy to implement both in ASICs and FPGAs.
The main difficulty in this P-TRNG design is related to the necessity to unbalance the two
TERO branches in a precise manner: too big asymmetry would cause that the number of
oscillation and consequently the entropy would be too small. Perfectly balanced TERO could
oscillate for too long time, i.e. oscillations could last longer than the control period (i.e. the
time interval between requests of the random bit from Fig. 4.7) and consequently, the counter
values would not be random.
Feasibility in FPGA seems problematic. ASIC technology offers finer grain control, however
as explained in the previous section making such a design robust against normal manufacturing
variations remains an open question. An ASIC implementation is needed, planned and will
help assess TERO-TRNG feasibility in ASIC technology.
Repeatability and Portability
Our experience shows that even if the difference in delays of the two TERO branches is set up
correctly in one device, another identical device could have very different number of oscillations
and consequently, it could output weak random numbers. The above-explained control over
critical design parameters is not important only for feasibility, but even more for repeatability.
An on-silicon (ASIC) verification is planned and needed.
The TERO-TRNG design is potentially portable, however, the size of the oscillators (the
frequency) and of the counter (number of bits) must be adapted to the selected technology and
of course, the problem related to the repeatability must be solved.
Scalability
The TERO-TRNG occupies small area and potentially high output bit rate. The mean bit rate
can thus be adapted to practical needs by stopping the generator. Because of the small size,
several generators can be used in parallel to increase the output bit rate.
4.5.3 Evaluation According to the Design Criteria
Output Bit Rate
The output bit rate is relatively high (considering the small size of the generator). Depending
on the technology, the bit rate of several Mbits per second can be reached.
Cost – Area and Patents Pending
The area of the TERO-TRNG is very small – only few gates and a counter are needed. Currently,
it is not known if any patent is pending on it.
Power and Energy Consumption
The power consumption is relatively high (the ring is oscillating at high frequency and two
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events are propagated in parallel). However, by taking profit from the high bit rate, the energy
consumption can be decreased by stopping the generator if random data is not needed.
4.5.4 Evaluation According to the Security Criteria
Evaluability According to AIS31
The principle of the TERO-TRNG is very simple and the source of randomness is well known.
The internal signal (output of the counter) can be used to characterize the source of entropy.
Availability or Feasibility of the Model
The comprehensive model of the TERO-TRNG was already published by the HECTOR project
partners [30]. The model uses three physical parameters as input. The values of these param-
eters can be obtained by statistical evaluation of the counter output.
Testability
The generator is easy to test – the parameters of the underlying stochastic model can be
computed from the distribution of counter values.
Robustness
It seems that the mean value of the counter can be manipulated externally by changing opera-
tional conditions (e.g. temperature and power voltage), but the variation of the counter values
(and thus entropy) cannot be easily manipulated.
4.6 Self-Timed Ring-Based TRNG
4.6.1 Principle and Design
As explained in Section 2.1.2, the STR is a multi-event ring oscillator without collision. In the
evenly-spaced mode the events are uniformly distributed over half an oscillation period. It will
also be recalled that the oscillation period in the steady state of STR is defined by the time
interval between two subsequent events traversing the stage and not by the number of stages.
A self-timed ring thus provides L jittery signals Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ L, with the same period T and a
constant mean phase difference between them.
In contrast to TRNGs using multiple ring oscillators as sources of randomness, in which the
uniform distribution of the phases of multiple clock signals originates from the independence of
rings [64], the uniformity of distribution of phases in STR is guaranteed by the STR principle,
which is based on two analog phenomena – the Charlie and the drafting effect.
Nevertheless, because of the presence of many jittery clock signals with uniformly distributed
phases, the entropy harvesting principle can be the same as in [64]. Left panel in Fig. 4.8 depicts
the STR-based TRNG published in [15]: the outputs of all the STR stages Ci are first sampled
at reference clock frequency to obtain samples si, 1 ≤ i ≤ L, which are then added modulo 2
using an XOR gate to obtain the digital noise signal
ψ = s1 ⊕ s2 ⊕ ...⊕ sL.
The entropy harvesting principle is illustrated in the right panel in Fig. 4.8. Since each signal
Ci is sampled at the same frequency (reference clock clk), for any sampling instant t, there
exists j such that |t− tj| ≤ 4ϕ2 , where tj is the switching time of the signal Cj.
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Figure 4.8: STR-TRNG core architecture and working principle
If the jittery region is larger than the phase difference 4ϕ, the signal Cj is sampled in this
region, as shown in the right panel in Fig. 4.8. The resulting sample sj then has a random
value, and hence the output of the XOR gate is also random.
The entropy rate of the output bit ψ is at least equal to the entropy of the sample sj. The
higher the magnitude of the jitter and the lower the phase difference4ϕ, the higher the entropy
of the sample sj and at the output of the TRNG.
The main advantage of using of the self-timed ring for the generation of random numbers is
that it makes it possible to adjust the mean time elapsed between successive events precisely.
This time lapse can be set as short as needed, and can thus be adjusted to the jitter magnitude
of a self-timed ring stage.
Another advantage of the STR is that the entropy rate at the output of the generator is
practically independent of the sampling clock frequency. It is sufficient that this frequency is
smaller than or equal to the generated clock frequency. Last but not least, the locking of the
ring clock to the reference clock thus will not have catastrophic consequences.
On the other hand, an attacker could reduce the number of events in the ring by fault injection
and thereby reducing the phase resolution. However, this is quite easy to detect and the ring
can be restarted with a right number of events.
4.6.2 Evaluation According to the Technology Criteria
Feasibility in FPGA and ASICs
The self-timed rings use logic functions which can be theoretically easily implemented in both
FPGAs and ASICs. However, the Muller cells, which are basic construction elements of the
STR, are not always available in standard cell libraries. This fact is in conflict with industrial
requirements: portability and compatibility with a standard digital design flow. Because of
routing restrictions, STRs with many cells used in STR-TRNG are difficult to implement in
FPGAs.
Portability and routing restrictions are apparently the biggest disadvantages of the STR
TRNG and the price to pay for obtaining a very high output bit rate of several hundred
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megabits per second [16].
Repeatability and Portability
The STR-TRNG is repeatable, meaning that two different devices containing the same project
will give results with the same statistical properties. However, the design is not directly portable
from one technology to another.
Scalability
Thanks to the Charlie and drafting effects, the jitter caused by the local noise sources in a cell
does not propagate across the ring as shown in [13]. Consequently, multiple outputs of the rings
can be used as sources of randomness. The generator is thus perfectly scalable.
4.6.3 Evaluation According to the Design Criteria
Output Bit Rate
The generator can reach extremely high bit rates of several hundred megabits per second at the
expense of high power consumption, since many high frequency events are propagating across
the ring.
Cost – Area and Patents Pending
The cost of the generator is relatively high – a high entropy generator needs many Muller cells
to properly operate.
Power and Energy Consumption
The power consumption of the generator is considerable. However, because its output bit rate
is very high, the generator can be stopped, once the needed amount of random bits has been
generated.
4.6.4 Evaluation According to the Security Criteria
Evaluability According to AIS31
The structure of the generator is very simple and regular. It can be easily studied and evaluated.
Availability or Feasibility of the Model
The stochastic model is not available up to now, but should be relatively easy to construct.
Testability
The entropy of the generator can be easily estimated from the known size of the jitter. The main
difficulty is therefore related to the existence of an appropriate method of jitter quantification
(jitter measurement).
Robustness
Like other free running oscillator, STRs are sensitive to variation of the global operational
conditions. This sensitivity can be reduced by exploitations of the differential principles: both
jittery clocks and the sampling clock must be generated by the similar STRs. The only security
weakness is the possibility to change the mode of oscillations from the evenly-spaced to burst
mode by fault injection. The oscillations in the burst mode could significantly reduce the
entropy.
HECTOR D2.1 Page 48 of 85
D2.1- Report on Selected TRNG and PUF Principles
4.7 Conclusions on RNG Selection
From the above presented analysis it is clear that an ideal TRNG does not exist. All the
presented generators will be first implemented in FPGAs and their parameters thoroughly
evaluated. This will provide further inputs and comparison data. Among the above selected
principles, at least one will be chosen for implementation in ASIC.
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Chapter 5
Selected PUF principles
According to the HECTOR project objectives, at least one PUF which is suitable for imple-
mentation in ASICs and at least one that is suitable for FPGAs should be preselected. The
preselected principles must fulfill all PUF criteria described in Chapter 3. Following the HEC-
TOR’s planning, the preselected PUF principles should then be further studied, enhanced and
hardened.
We preselected the following PUF principles:
• RO-based PUF (RO-PUF)
• TERO-based PUF (TERO-PUF)
• SRAM-based PUF (SRAM-PUF)
These PUFs will next be analyzed from the point of view of the criteria defined in Sec. 3.2.
5.1 RO-Based and TERO-Based PUFs
5.1.1 Principle and Design
Ring oscillators (ROs) are digital oscillators consisting of a chain of inverting logic elements
connected to form a loop. Traditionally, they are composed of an odd number of inverters
(which may include an initialization stage) to ensure steady oscillatory behavior.
Behavior of the transient effect ring oscillators (TEROs) corresponds to a very specific con-
figuration of ROs in which the number of inverters is even. Contrary to classical ROs, TEROs
require two initialization stages and have two functioning modes: a transient oscillatory state
followed by a stable steady state. Figure 5.1 shows the generic architecture of ROs and TEROs.
The oscillatory behavior in both ROs and TEROs is due to the propagation of electrical transi-
tions across the ring structure. When a stage i has the same input and output value, it switches
its output after a time D corresponding to the propagation delay of the gate. We refer to this
process as an ”event” happening at the output of the stage i.
Inside an RO, one inverting cell has always conflictual output/input values due to the odd
number of inverters. This cell switches its output after a propagation delay D, which transfers
the output/input conflict to the following cell: an event propagates from cell i to cell i+ 1.
Figure 5.2 shows typical output sequences of RO and TERO. For 7-stage ROs, an output
state is represented by a vector of 7 bits corresponding (from left to right) to the nodes C0 to
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Figure 5.1: Generic architecture of ROs and TEROs
C6 with respect to the index in Fig. 5.1. Whatever the propagation delays in the ring stages,
all 7-stage ROs have the same sequence of states although the time of each state may vary. The
oscillatory behavior of the RO corresponds to the constant propagation of one event across the
ring structure.
Figure 5.2 represent the sequences of output signals of two 8-stage TEROs, where each
stage has a different timing characteristics, from node C0 to node C7 according to the index
in Fig. 5.1. The goal of the initialization stages in TEROs is to trigger two events that can
propagate simultaneously across the ring structure (by forcing the initial state in Fig. 5.2). The
transient oscillatory regime in TEROs is due to the propagation of those two events across the
structure.
Contrary to ROs, the output sequence in TEROs can vary from one TERO to another
depending on specific timing characteristics of each ring stage. For instance, in TERO 1, the
propagation delay of stage C1 is shorter than the propagation delay of stage C5, whereas in
TERO 2, the propagation delay of stage C1 is longer than the propagation delay of stage C5.
Starting from the same initial state ”00101101” (Sequences 1.1 and 2.1), the following state in
TERO 1 is ”01101101” (Event 1 propagates first) whereas in TERO 2 it is ”00101001” (Event
2 propagates first). More generally, the transition from one state to another depends on the
propagation delays of the stages in which the two events occur, but also on the relative duration
of the previous state (or in other words, the relative position of the two events). When two
events happen at adjacent stages (Sequences 1.3, 2.2 and 2.3), the input level of one stage may
vary before it has completely switched its output (for example to ’1’), the output level starts
switching in the opposite level (to ’0’) before the appropriate voltage level (’1’) is detected by
the next stage (Sequences 1.3 and 2.3). We refer to this situation as a collision between the two
events. When events ultimately collide in a TERO, one of its two final steady states (either
”01010101” or ”10101010” in the 8-stage TERO) is reached.
In practice, the RO produces a digital clock with a duty cycle that approaches 50%. Its
frequency depends on the number of inverters as well as on the propagation delay of each
ring stage. The TERO produces a signal with transient oscillations and a variable duty cycle.
The oscillation frequency depends on the propagation delays of the ring stages as well as on
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their number. The duty cycle corresponds to the ”distance” between the two events as they
propagate across the ring (i.e. the time that elapses between the two events seen at the output
of one ring stage). The number of transient oscillations depends on the propagation delay of
each stage but also on the capacitive charge and discharge parameters of its output.
Figure 5.2: Typical output sequences of ROs and TEROs
Based on [63] and [11], Fig. 5.3 proposes a generic architecture for oscillator based PUFs.
As originally proposed in [63], the RO-PUF extracts MPV in a digital circuit by comparing the
oscillation frequencies of two identically implemented ROs. In Fig. 5.3, the oscillators are ROs
whereas the subtractor is a comparator (which can be seen as a 1-bit subtractor). The number
of oscillations counted during a fixed time window is compared to provide a one-bit response
to the challenge, which consists in selecting two ROs.
In [11], ROs are replaced by TEROs and the comparator is replaced by an n-bit subtractor.
The core architecture of a TERO PUF is composed of two blocks of L identical TEROs. When
selected and initialized, each TERO presents transient oscillations at its output (contrary to
ROs, which present permanent oscillations). The number of transient oscillations varies between
identically implemented TEROs due to MPV.
In a TERO-PUF, each challenge, denoted C(i, j) (with 0 ≤ i, j ≤ L−1), consists of selecting
TERO i from Block A, and TERO j from Block B using multiplexers. The number of available
challenges is L2. An n-bit response is obtained from each challenge by subtracting the number
of TEROs’ oscillations. The goal of this subtraction is to reduce the influence of environmental
global variations since they tend to affect each logic cell in the circuit equally. The L2 challenges
can be divided into k sets of m challenges in order to obtain responses of m× n bits.
When used in security primitives such as PUFs and TRNGs, TEROs have many advantages
over classical ROs due to their transient oscillations. Locking phenomena are theoretically less
likely due to the very brief time during which the TERO oscillates. In an RO, the number of
oscillations in a fixed time window depends directly on the ring frequency. By acquiring the
ring frequencies of a RO-PUF using the EM channel, an adversary can mathematically clone
the PUF. In Section 3 and Section 5, we show that the number of transient oscillations in a
TERO-PUF does not only depend on its frequency, but also on the signal slopes. Measuring
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Figure 5.3: Generic core architecture of RO-PUFs and TERO-PUFs
the ring frequencies using the EM channel and obtaining all the required parameters to build
a model is obviously more challenging and cannot be achieved only using contactless scanning.
Table 5.1: Comparison of the RO-PUF presented in [63] with the TERO-PUF presented in [11]
RO-PUF [63] TERO-PUF [11]
Entropy source MPV MPV
Entropy extractor RO, steady oscillating state TERO, transient oscillating state
followed by a stable steady state
Extraction vector Oscillation frequency Duration of the transient
oscillations
Bit generation Frequency comparison Differential measurement of the
number of transient oscillations
Number of response bits
per challenge
1 bit in [63], more than one bit
possible in theory Several
Leakages RO frequencies (EM channel) Unknown
Table 5.1 compares the RO-PUF, as proposed in [63], with the TERO-PUF. Like the RO-
PUF, the TERO-PUF is based on logic elements and adapts very well to FPGA and ASIC
design flows and process technologies. The proposed architecture allows a large number of
challenge and response pairs (CRPs): L2 in Fig. 5.3. Responses can be built using one or more
bits from the subtractor value. The way the responses are generated significantly affects their
statistical quality and the overall size of the design.
5.1.2 Evaluation According to the Technology Criteria
Feasibility in FPGA and ASICs
RO-PUF and TERO-PUF are suitable for implementation in both FPGAs and ASICs. Partner
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UJM has available hardware implementations of RO-PUF and TERO-PUF with 350 nm CMOS
ASIC (30 devices available), 45 nm CMOS Xilix Spartan 6 SRAM FPGA (30 devices available),
28 nm Altera Cyclone V SRAM FPGA (30 devices available) CBM15. TEC has the RO-PUF
implemented in a 65 nm ASIC technology available [44]. Other implementations of RO-PUF
are available in the literature, e.g. [48] (90 nm Xilinx Spartan-3E).
Repeatability and Portability
The portability of the design is not limited. The topology of the design remains the same from
one technology to another one. Nevertheless, the design needs manual placement and routing
for each technology. Once designed for the given technology, the RO-PUF and TERO-PUF are
freely repeatable.
Scalability
The design of RO-PUF and TERO-PUF is scalable (but the size of the multiplexers could limit
the implementation in ASIC).
5.1.3 Evaluation According to the Design Criteria
Number of Response Bits per Challenge
For the TERO-PUF, by using the difference of the number of oscillations, it is possible to
generate from one to three bits after the subtractor to obtain response with the steadiness of
up to 10% and the uniqueness of more than 40% in corner conditions for both FPGA and ASIC.
For the RO-PUF, the usual architecture uses only the result of frequency comparison, pro-
viding only one bit per challenge. However, it should be possible to use also the difference of
the frequencies to generate from one to two bits after the subtractor.
Cost – Area and Patents Pending
The PUF area is determined by the length of the ring. For the same frequency of oscillations,
the TERO-PUF uses one AND gate more than the RO-PUF. The area of the additional logic
is not negligible: 2 multiplexers, 2 counters, 2 shift-registers (only for TERO-PUF), and a
subtractor or comparator is needed.
We underline that for both PUFs, the ASIC implementations require larger oscillators than
the FPGA implementations while having similar PUF performance at nominal temperature and
voltage conditions. The ASIC implementation of the RO-PUF uses more than two times more
basic cells than the TERO-PUF implementation, while having slightly lower PUF performance
at nominal temperature (T) and voltage (Vdd) conditions [14]. The RO-PUF and TERO-PUF
are apparently not patented.
Power and Energy Consumption
The energy and power consumption is technology dependent, it should be limited if the ROs
and the TEROs are not supplied when the PUF is not in use.
5.1.4 Evaluation According to the Quality Criteria
For illustration, we provide below the results of one TERO-PUF and two RO-PUF implemen-
tations published in [14] and [48], respectively. To make this comparison relevant, we only
compare the TERO-PUF configuration with a one bit response per challenge with RO-PUFs
which also generate a one bit response per challenge.
Uniqueness
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The uniqueness of the RO-PUF is 47.3% in a 90 nm Xilinx FPGAs [48] and 49.5% in a 65 nm
CMOS ASIC [44]. On the other hand, the uniqueness of the TERO-PUF is 48.46% in a 45 nm
Xilinx FPGA, 47.62% in a 28 nm Altera FPGA [14], and 49.7% in a 350 nm CMOS ASIC, .
Steadiness
Steadiness of the RO-PUF is 0.9% in a 90 nm Xilinx FPGA [48] and 2.8% in a 65nm CMOS
ASIC [44]. Steadiness of TERO-PUF is 1.8% in a 45 nm Xilinx FPGA, 2.63% in a 28 nm Altera
FPGA [14], and 0.6% in a 350 nm ASIC, .
Note that for both the RO-PUF and the TERO-PUF, responses can easily be made more
unique and more robust to environmental variations by increasing the number of stages in the
oscillators, which makes them at the same time less sensitive to the intrinsic noise [14].
Randomness
The TERO-PUF provides 0.97 to 0.99 bits of entropy per response bit in a 350 nm ASIC
and 0.85 to 1 bit of entropy per response bits in a 45 nm Xilinx FPGA [14]. Randomness of
the RO-PUF implemented in a 60 nm ALTERA FPGA is measured experimentally in [24].
The authors use the response uniformity metric close to bit-aliasing, while taking into account
the independence of bits. Experimental results show response uniformity close to 0.5, but the
results depend on the placement of ROs in the device.
5.1.5 Evaluation According to the Security Criteria
Availability or Feasibility of the Model
Currently, stochastic models of the RO-PUF or TERO-PUF are not published/available.
Robustness Against Attacks
The RO-PUF is sensitive to the EM analysis and attacks as shown in [6], [51] and [50]. By
using the number of oscillations instead of the oscillation frequency, the TERO-PUF should be
less sensitive to this kind of side channel attacks.
5.2 SRAM-PUF
5.2.1 Principle and Design
SRAM PUFs, as proposed by Holcomb et al. [36], are among the most popular and therefore
best-studied PUFs in research literature. The original design consists of a default SRAM
component, without any modifications to the circuitry. Due to manufacturing variations in the
six-transistor (6T) cells, in particular mismatch between the cross-coupled inverters, each cell
has a preference to boot either in the zero or one state. So when ramping up the supply voltage
of the SRAM, from 0V to Vdd, a unique fingerprint appears, as illustrated in Figure 5.4. To
each cell, we assign a probability p that it initializes in the one state, as can be determined
experimentally by booting the SRAM numerous times. We distinguish between stable cells,
having p ≈ 0 or p ≈ 1, and unstable cells, approaching p ≈ 0.5. As with any other PUF, helper
data algorithms are required in order to obtain a stable and uniformly distributed fingerprint.
The popularity of SRAM PUFs originates from its convenient off-the-shelf nature. Inspired
by [36], numerous experimental studies have been performed to quantify the PUF character-
istics, including intra-distance and inter-distance. For instance, in the European FP7 project
UNIQUE, running from 2009 to 2012, SRAM PUFs were cast in 65nm CMOS technology. We
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Figure 5.4: An SRAM fingerprint [36]. The grayscale encodes the probability p that a given
cell initializes in the one state. White and black cells, corresponding with p ≈ 0 and p ≈ 1
respectively are referred to as stable. Gray cells, centered around p ≈ 0.5, are referred to as
unstable.
refer to [38] for the numerical results summarized in tables. Also, we note that SRAM PUFS
are commercially available, provided by Intrinsic-ID [2].
Many variations on the original SRAM PUF design have been proposed. A first category
of variations applies to the 6T cell. Simply stated, we can plug-in any other bistable memory
element. An example thereof is the so-called butterfly PUF [41], targeting FPGA platforms.
A second category of variations aims to facilitate the helper data algorithm. It is a common
practice to retain the most stable bits only, or stated otherwise, to discard the most unreliable
bits. The SRAM circuitry may be adjusted so as to provide rapid thresholding of the aforemen-
tioned parameter p, eliminating the need to boot-cycle the SRAM numerous times. This was
proposed by Bhargava and Mai in [8], with a prototype manufactured in 65nm CMOS. The
same approach was also adopted in the European FP7 project HINT [1], running from 2012 to
2015.
5.2.2 Evaluation According to the Technology Criteria
Feasibility in FPGA and ASICs
SRAM PUFs are primarily suitable for ASIC platforms. However, FPGA platforms are not to
be excluded. A first example is the aforementioned butterfly PUF [41]. Second, the internal
block memories of recent FPGAs might allow for boot-cycling [72]. In addition, the internal
SRAM of several commercial microcontrollers might be used as a PUF [70].
Repeatability and Portability
The portability of the design is not limited. The topology of the design remains the same from
one technology node to another. Furthermore, SRAMs are typically among the first components
that are being mapped to a new technology node. Once designed for the given technology, the
SRAM PUF is freely repeatable.
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Scalability
SRAMs are scalable. For large data sizes, cell contents are typically distributed over indepen-
dent memory blocks.
5.2.3 Evaluation According to the Design Criteria
Number of Response Bits per Challenge
The data address is regarded as a challenge while the data itself is regarded as the response.
The length of a single response is typically several bytes. The total number of response bits is
typically several kbyte or Mbyte.
Cost – Area and Patents Pending
The design comprehends a so-called weak PUF: the total circuit area is roughly proportional
to the total number of response bits.
Intrinsic-ID [2] applied for several patents, aiming to enhance the circuitry1. However, the
core SRAM PUF functionally is not patented, as this design originates from open research [36].
Power and Energy Consumption
The energy and power consumption is technology dependent. It should be limited if the SRAM
is not supplied when the PUF is not in use.
5.2.4 Evaluation According to the Quality Criteria
In the following section, essential quality criteria have been evaluated based on real PUFs. The
PUF source are 65nm TSMC ASICs, which were developed in the course of the FP7 research
project UNIQUE 2.
Randomness
In the PUF context, the Hamming weight gives a first impression of the distribution of 1 and 0
within a response. It is desirable for PUFs to have a fractional Hamming weight of close to 0.5
since this indicates that the PUF response does not show a preference for a certain value. In
case of SRAM PUFs, the fractional Hamming weight is always close to the optimum of 0.5 even
for different environmental temperatures. This is also reflected by the entropy. SRAM-PUFs
provide 0.99 to 1.00 bits of entropy per response bit.
Uniqueness
If the Hamming weight deviates from 0.5, not only the entropy is influenced but also the
resemblance between different PUFs will increase, which negatively impacts uniqueness [67,
p. 22]. Furthermore, the responses from two different devices should not be correlated and
must differ with high probability. The inter-device distance, cf. EC in Section 2.2.2, is used
to evaluate the uniqueness of a PUF device. For the evaluated SRAM-PUFs the uniqueness is
around 49%.
Steadiness
The bit error probability is the metric for steadiness and corresponds to the intra-device dis-
tance, cf. IC in Section 2.2.2, which is defined as the distance between the two responses,
resulting from applying the same challenge twice to a PUF. For SRAM-PUFs the steadiness is
1http://www.faqs.org/patents/assignee/intrinsic-id-bv/
2www.unique.technicon.com
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5% to 6% at room temperature, and slightly higher ( 7%) for extreme temperatures (−40◦C,
85◦C).
5.2.5 Evaluation According to the Security Criteria
Availability or Feasibility of the Model
Roel Maes [43] presented a probabilistic reliability model, which allows to model the bit rate
of SRAM PUFs.
Robustness Against Attacks
As any other security building block, SRAM-PUFs are potentially vulnerable to side-channel
attacks. Helfmeier et al. [32] described optical emission attacks on SRAM-PUFs, while Oren,
Sadeghi and Wachsmann [52] presented remanence decay side-channel attacks on SRAM PUFs.
5.3 Conclusions on PUF Selection
From the above presented analysis it is clear that an ideal PUF does not exist. All the pre-
sented physical unclonable functions will be first implemented in FPGAs and their parameters
thoroughly evaluated. This will provide further inputs and comparison data. Among the above
selected principles, at least one will be chosen for implementation in ASIC.
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Chapter 6
Implementation of Selected TRNG and
PUF Cores in FPGAs
6.1 Methodology
As explained in previous chapters, the objective of the implementation of selected TRNG and
PUF cores in FPGAs was to fairly evaluate their design and behavior when operating at the
same conditions. One of the advantages of using FPGAs in this phase of the project was, that
thanks to the flexibility of FPGAs, many DUT configurations and topologies could be tested in
a relatively short time. On the other hand, it must be taken into account that some obtained
results and observations cannot be directly generalized to ASICs.
We recall that our objective was to use the same hardware configuration, and the same FPGA
family for all TRNG and PUF cores. For practical reasons (availability of evaluation boards),
we decided to use the Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA family for implementation of all TRNGs and
PUFs in this first stage of the project.
Since the HECTOR evaluation board with the Spartan 6 module was not available from the
very beginning of the HECTOR project, we adapted existing Evariste hardware/software design
tools available at the Hubert Curien Laboratory (UJM partner) to our needs. The modifications
of the Evariste system made in the framework of the HECTOR project are described briefly in
the next sections.
6.1.1 Data acquisition hardware/software
In the first stage of the HECTOR project, the Evariste acquisition card and associated software
was adapted to transfer data streams of up to 4 MB from the Device Under Test (DUT) to the
PC via USB bus. The complete acquisition system has three components (see Fig. 6.1): the
DUT, the Acquisition card and the PC running the software.
The DUT can be implemented in any hardware device featuring outputs that support low
voltage differential signaling (LVDS), e.g. the Evariste FPGA hardware modules. The acquisi-
tion card is composed of the Evariste motherboard containing the Cyclone III FPGA module,
which includes a 4 MB RAM memory. The DUT is connected to the acquisition card using a
simple serial connection and the acquisition board is connected to the PC using the USB bus.
It is clear from Fig. 6.1 that the DUT is expected to send a serial data stream and a data
strobe signal via two LVDS links. This is advantageous for several reasons:
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1. The data interface in the DUT is very simple and its impact on the operation of the
TRNG or PUF core is reduced to a minimum.
2. Because of the use of the LVDS data transfer method, the DUT can be placed relatively
far from the acquisition card (e.g. placed in a Faraday cage) and the data transfer is more
robust.
3. The use of the memory block guarantees undisrupted data transfers from DUT to PC
(note that the USB bus cannot guarantee continuity of data transfers).
DUT CypressEZ USBFPGA
LVDS Data
LVDS Clock/Strobe
4 MB
RAM
Evariste 
motherboard
FPGA module
USB 
bus Host PC
Figure 6.1: Block diagram of the acquisition system based on the Evariste hardware/software
tools
The bit rate of the serial data stream can vary between 0 and 16 Mbits/s in the asynchronous
data transfer mode and between 6 and 400 Mbits/s in the synchronous data transfer mode.
The two basic modes of the data transfer are described in detail in the next sections.
6.1.2 Asynchronous Data Acquisition Mode
In the asynchronous data acquisition mode, the data in the bit-stream are validated by the
rising edge of the data strobe signal. The data rate can vary between 0 (or almost zero) and 16
Mbits/s and it can be irregularly distributed in time. The width of the data strobe pulse must
be longer than 31.25 ns (see Fig. 6.2).
T
d  
 (> 31.25 ns) 
strobe
data
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1sample
Figure 6.2: Waveforms of the asynchronous data acquisition
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Up to 4 MB of data can be saved in the acquisition card memory in real time, so the
smallest data rate is limited only by the total acquisition time, which can be very long for small
frequencies.
6.1.3 Synchronous Data Acquisition Mode
In the synchronous data acquisition mode, the data arrival to the acquisition card is synchro-
nized by the data clock. Inside the acquisition card, the acquisition clock signal is synchronized
to this input data clock using a phase-locked loop (PLL). The data clock signal coming from
the DUT can have any frequency between 6 MHz and 400 MHz and it has to be provided con-
tinuously (the internal logic runs using this clock signal). Data bits arriving to the acquisition
card are registered on the rising edges of this clock signal (see Fig. 6.3).
T
clk  
 (2.5 - 1667 ns) 
clk
data
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0sample
Figure 6.3: Waveforms of the synchronous data acquisition
6.2 Strategy of TRNG and PUF Implementation and
Evaluation
We repeat that our aim was to fairly evaluate several aspects of the TRNG and PUF designs:
their feasibility in FPGAs and difficulties related to their implementation in reconfigurable
devices, their cost in term of combinatorial and sequential elements such as LUTs and flip-flops
used, their power and/or energy consumption, the entropy rate and bit rate at the output in
case of TRNGs and the number of bits per challenge in case of PUFs.
Concerning the topology of individual TRNGs and PUFs, our objective was to reduce inter-
nal complexity of the modules, while maintaining the data interface described in the previous
section. In order to reduce the vulnerability of the generators and PUFs to external manipu-
lations, we avoided to use external clocks – all clock signals are generated inside the evaluated
blocks, for example using a ring oscillator with a convenient topology.
The architectures of logic elements (or logic cells) in various FPGA families are slightly differ-
ent. Nevertheless, all of them are currently divided into two parts: LUTs and registers. In our
area comparisons, we distinguish between the use of LUTs (purely combinatorial cells), regis-
ters (purely register cells) and the combined use of LUTs and registers (combined combinatorial
and sequential cells). These three cases can be usually recognized in all implementations in all
families.
One of the parameters used for design evaluation is the power consumption. The power
consumption of TRNGs and PUFs is relatively small and it is mostly comparable to, or even
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smaller than, the standby power consumption of an empty device. For this reason, we first
implemented a reference design, in which an input static signal just crossed the device and no
logic was implemented inside. The Spartan 6 device with this small reference project consumed
4.7 mW. This power is then subtracted from the total power consumptions measured in all
experiments. The tables presented in the following sections give thus the net power consumption
of the tested designs.
For a coarse evaluation of the statistical quality of the generated signals, we use the NIST SP
800-90B test suite, because it makes possible an easy evaluating the independence of random
variables and evaluation of the entropy rate.
6.3 Study of the ELO-TRNG Core Implemented in FPGA
6.3.1 TRNG Design
The block diagram of the elementary oscillator based TRNG (ELO-TRNG) core implemented
in the selected Spartan 6 FPGA is depicted in Fig. 6.4. The TRNG core uses two identical ring
oscillators (RO1 and RO2) as sources of randomness. Thanks to the differential principle, the
impact of the global sources of randomness, which can be easily manipulated, is significantly
reduced. The two identical rings were composed of two and five buffers (N = 2 and N = 5) in
two different TRNG configurations, which were tested.
The time base (the sampling period) was generated using a 20-bit synchronous counter, which
divided the RO2 output clock frequency by K. The sampling period (and thus the parameter
K) was set up depending on the clock frequency and the size of the jitter, which was measured
at an LVDS output of the FPGA using a high bandwidth differential probe of the oscilloscope.
The parameter K was computed according to Equation (2) in [29]. The period jitter of the
clock signal generated in both ring oscillators was between 4.8 and 5.3 ps for the clock periods
of about 5 ns and between 5.5 and 6 ps for the clock periods of about 10 ns and the total period
jitter exploited in the TRNG was about 7 ps and 8 ps, respectively.
RO1
   DFF
D
             Q
 clkFrequency divider by K
 clk_in
Digital 
noise
Strobe
...
RO2
'1'
...
1 N
1 N
Figure 6.4: Architecture of the ELO-TRNG core as implemented in Spartan 6 FPGA
The two ring oscillators were placed and routed manually in order to maintain repeatability
of the design in future TRNG implementations, since we plan to study the impact of the activity
of the surrounding logic (such as a USB data interface or a cipher). Although both rings were
placed in the close vicinity, apparently, they did not lock.
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6.3.2 Implementation Results
Results of implementation of the two configurations of the ELO-TRNG core in the Xilinx
Spartan 6 FPGA family are presented in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Results of implementation of the ELO-TRNG in the Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA family
Configuration Frequency K Bit rate Area Power cons. Entropy
[MHz] [·103] [Mbits/s] (LUT/Reg/L&R) [mW] per bit
1 NAND + 2 Buf. ' 200 51.766 0.0034 23/0/18 1.38 0.896
1 NAND + 5 Buf. ' 100 122.432 0.0008 31/0/19 0.96 0.931
6.3.3 Discussion
Several facts concerning the ELO-TRNG core can be derived from implementation results:
• The area of the TRNG is relatively small at the expense of a low output bit rate.
• The design is simple and it is thus simple to analyze and to model.
• The rings should have the same topology in order to compensate the impact of the global
jitter sources on the generator. This requires manual placement (and eventually routing)
of rings, which is a relatively simple operation.
• Higher clock frequency increases the output bit rate at the cost of higher power consump-
tion.
• Since at each moment, there is only one event (rising or falling edge), which propagates
in the ring, the power consumption of the ring does not depend on the number of delay
elements and it is almost constant in all rings. Therefore, the higher power consumption
of the TRNG is not caused by a higher number of delay elements in the rings, but rather
by the frequency of the clock signal used in the counter.
6.4 Study of the COSO-TRNG Core Implemented in
FPGA
6.4.1 TRNG design
The block diagram of the coherent sampling oscillator based TRNG (COSO-TRNG) core im-
plemented in the selected Spartan 6 FPGA is depicted in Fig. 6.5. The two oscillators have
the same number of elements (N = 2) and their topology (placement of the delay elements) is
the same. The period jitter of both clock signals, which was measured using the LVDS outputs
of the device and a differential oscilloscope probe, was about 4.8 ps with a period of about
5 ns. The total jitter exploited in the TRNG (when assuming independence of the two clock
generators) was therefore about 6.8 ps. This value is needed to know the maximum acceptable
difference between the two clock periods.
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Figure 6.5: Architecture of the COSO-TRNG core as implemented in Spartan 6 FPGA
The clock signal s1 was sampled in a D flip-flop on rising edges of the clock signal s2. The
resulting beat signal was then used to flip the T flip-flop (a 1-bit counter).
The main difficulty in designing the COSO-TRNG is the need to precisely set up the periods
of the two rings – the difference in the output periods must be small enough, i.e. comparable in
size to the period jitter. Unfortunately, even the rings that have exactly the same topology can
generate clock signals with periods, which differ too much because of dispersion of electrical
parameters inside the device.
In order to obtain two periods that are sufficiently close, we placed one oscillator at a stable
position inside FPGA and the other ring was moved automatically (using a script written in
the TCL language) to different places in the device until the period difference between the
two generated clock signals was sufficiently small. Once a convenient difference in periods was
obtained, the placement and routing constraints of the two oscillators were saved to prevent
any changes caused by future project recompilations.
The process of finding the right solution can be further optimized, however, the results
will remain device dependent – this optimization process must be repeated individually for all
devices. This makes the practical use of the generator questionable, if some other automatic
way of setting up the clock frequencies will not be found.
6.4.2 Implementation Results
Results of implementation of the COSO-TRNG core in the Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA family are
presented in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Results of implementation of the COSO-TRNG in the Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA family
Configuration Fr. RO1 Fr. RO2 Bit rate Area Power cons. Entropy
[MHz] [MHz] [Mbits/s] (LUT/Reg/L&R) [mW] per bit
1 NAND + 2 Buf. ' 204.7 ' 204.24 1.32 5/1/2 0.8 0.9597
6.4.3 Discussion
Several facts concerning the COSO-TRNG core can be derived from implementation results:
• The area of the TRNG is very small, while the output bit rate can be relatively high.
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• The architecture of the TRNG is simple, but the design needs placement of at least one
ring on a per-device basis. Once the difference in periods is sufficiently small, the design
can be easily modeled.
• Since the rings have the same topology (this requirement is a must for reducing the period
difference), the impact of the global jitter sources on the generator is significantly reduced.
• Higher clock frequency increases the output bit rate, while the power consumption does
not change significantly.
6.5 Study of the PLL-TRNG Core Implemented in FPGA
6.5.1 TRNG design
The block diagram of the PLL-TRNG core implemented in the Spartan 6 FPGA is depicted
in Fig. 6.6. The Spartan 6 device used in the Evariste modules has only two PLLs available.
Moreover, the device-specific PLL routing constraints make the design of the PLL-TRNG less
straightforward than in other FPGA families (e.g. Altera or Microsemi).
The main difficulty in designing the PLL-TRNG in Spartan 6 family is related to the fact
that the outputs of the PLL block are routed via dedicated clock wires into different clock
regions. However, because of the TRNG principle (one clock signal must be sampled in a D
flip-flop using another clock signal), both clock signals generated in two different PLLs must
appear in the same clock region.
The easiest solution currently available is to use a non-dedicated clock path constraint that
forces the router to route the PLL output signal via general purpose interconnection wires (not
the dedicated clock paths). We ensured that only the clkjit (i.e. the sampled clock) signal was
routed this way and the clkref (the sampling clock) was routed via a standard dedicated clock
path. We are aware that this kind of routing could be more sensitive to ambient noises and it
could thus bring more unwanted (manipulable) jitter to the clock signal.
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Figure 6.6: Architecture of the PLL-TRNG core as implemented in Spartan 6 FPGA
Fortunately, PLL blocks in Altera and Microsemi FPGAs do not have this kind of constraint
and we can therefore expect that the PLL-TRNG will be easier to implement in these FPGAs.
6.5.2 Implementation Results
Results of implementation of the PLL-TRNG core in the Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA family are
presented in Table 6.3.
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Table 6.3: Results of implementation of the PLL-TRNG in the Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA family
Config. RO fr. PLL1 PLL2 Final Bit rate Area Power con. Entropy
[MHz] [KM/KD] [KM/KD] [KM/KD] [Mbits/s] (L/R/L&R) [mW] per bit
Two PLLs ' 200 17/7 37/81 1377/259 0.35 15/0/13 10.5 0.860
6.5.3 Discussion
Several facts concerning the PLL-TRNG core can be derived from implementation results:
• The PLLs are expensive hardware blocks, since they occupy huge silicon area. However,
in the context of FPGAs, they are available ‘for free’. However, on the other side, once
used in TRNG, they will not be available for the rest of the design. This disadvantage
can be reduced by sharing at least one PLL by the TRNG and the application design.
• Besides the area occupied by PLLs, the additional area of the TRNG is very small – it is
occupied essentially by the ring oscillator serving as a source of the clock signal.
• Because of the use of voltage controlled oscillators (VCO) oscillating at high frequencies,
the power consumption of the TRNG is relatively high.
• The generator does not need manual placement and routing.
• The source of randomness is perfectly isolated from the rest of the device.
6.6 Study of the DC-TRNG Core Implemented in FPGA
6.6.1 TRNG design
The block diagram of the DC-TRNG core architecture is depicted in Fig. 6.7. A 3-element
ring-oscillator RO1, implemented using 3 LUTs, is used as the entropy source. Each LUT is
placed in a separate slice. The entropy is extracted using 3 tapped delay lines and a priority
encoder. Each tapped delay line is implemented using a delay chain of 9 slices. In each slice
a CARRY4 element and 4 flip-flops are utilized. CARRY4 elements from the same delay line
are placed in neighboring slices along the y-axis. Placement constraints are specified within the
Verilog description. Half of all slices available on Spartan-6 contain CARRY4 primitives.
Another ring oscillator (RO2) generated the clock of 125MHz, which was used to generate
the time base. Two configurations were tested, one with jitter accumulation time of 2 clock
cycles (N = 2) and one with accumulation time of 4 clock cycles (N = 4).
6.6.2 Implementation Results
The results of implementation of the DC-TRNG core in the Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA family are
presented in Table 6.4.
6.6.3 Discussion
Several facts concerning the DC-TRNG core can be derived from implementation results:
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Figure 6.7: Architecture of the DC-TRNG
Table 6.4: Results of implementation of the DC-TRNG in the Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA family
Configuration RO1 freq. RO2 freq. Bit Rate Area Power cons. Entropy
[MHz] [MHz] [Mbits/s] (LUT/Reg/L&R) [mW] [per bit]
tA = 16ns ' 280 ' 125 62.5 (65/0/110) 9.66 0.110
tA = 32ns ' 280 ' 125 31.25 (65/0/112) 10.02 0.353
• For the implementation of tapped delay lines, the design uses FPGA primitives that ar
neither LUTs nor Registers. In the area column, these results are repported as fully
occupied slices (all 4 LUTs and 4 FFs).
• Placement constrains are needed for the ring oscillator (each LUT is placed in a separate
slice).
• The core has a compact implementation occupying only 54 slices on Spartan-6 FPGA.
• The architecture of the TRNG is very simple. Placement constraints are required but
they can be specified within the Verilog file. No routing constraints are required.
• The output bit rate is very high. Entropy per bit can be improved by using a longer
accumulation time at the cost of the decreased output bit rate.
6.7 Study of the TERO-TRNG Core Implemented in
FPGA
6.7.1 TRNG design
The block diagram of the transition effect ring oscillator based TRNG (TERO-TRNG) core
implemented in the Spartan 6 FPGA is depicted in Fig. 6.8. The TERO cell is built up using
12 buffers and 1 NAND gate per branch. The control signal is generated with a ring oscillator
(NAND+12 buffers) connected to a 7-bit synchronous counter. The duty cycle of the TRNG
control signal, which is the most significant bit of the counter, is 50%. The duty cycle can be
changed in the future to improve the bitrate – only a small part of the control period is needed
to reset the counter.
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We also implemented the TERO core with 8 buffers per branch, but the number of oscillations
was very low and relatively stable – not enough entropy could be accumulated during few
oscillation periods. Even with 12 buffers, the number of oscillations did not change too much
and consequently, the entropy rate was relatively low (see results presented in the following
section).
. . .
. . .
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Figure 6.8: Architecture of the TERO-TRNG core as implemented in Spartan 6 FPGA
6.7.2 Implementation Results
Results of implementation of the TERO-TRNG core in the Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA family are
presented in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Results of implementation of the TERO-TRNG in the Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA family
Configuration RO fr. Number Bit rate Area Power cons. Entropy
[MHz] [of oscill.] [Mbits/s] (LUT/Reg/L&R) [mW] [per bit]
(1 NAND + 12 Buf) x 2 215.26 36 0.419 38/0/7 1.0 0.275
6.7.3 Discussion
Several facts concerning the TERO-TRNG core can be derived from implementation results:
• The area of the TRNG is very small, while the output bit rate can be relatively high.
• The architecture of the TRNG is simple, but in order to achieve sufficient entropy rate, the
two TERO cell branches must be balanced in such a way that the number of oscillation
periods will be between 100 and 200. This is difficult to obtain repeatedly. Perfectly
balanced TERO cell will oscillate permanently and very unbalanced cell will feature very
few oscillation periods.
• The number of delay elements does not have direct impact on the power consumption,
since in each TERO configuration at any time, two events (two rising edges or falling
edges) pass across the TERO cell. However, it seems that higher number of delay elements
makes the TERO cell design easier, then the balance can be set up in smaller steps.
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6.8 Study of the STR-TRNG Core Implemented in FPGA
6.8.1 TRNG design
The block diagram of the STR-TRNG core implemented in the Spartan 6 FPGA is depicted in
Fig. 6.9. As explained earlier, the STR must work in the evenly spaced mode. Therefore, the
Muller cells must feature additional reset and preset inputs, which allow to set up the correct
number of events during initialization of the self-timed ring.
The sampling clock is generated by an additional ring oscillator. Each STR stage is sampled
in the D flip-flop and then they are XOR-ed together. The XOR output is sampled again in
another D flip-flop at the same frequency.
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Figure 6.9: Architecture of the STR-TRNG core as implemented in Spartan 6 FPGA
6.8.2 Implementation Results
Results of implementation of the STR-TRNG core in the Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA family are
presented in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Results of implementation of the STR-TRNG in the Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA family
Configuration STR freq. RO freq. Bit rate Area Power cons. Entropy
[MHz] [MHz] [Mbits/s] (LUT/Reg/L&R) [mW] [per bit]
127 Muller cells 307.6 143 143 7/0/170 18.96 0.9305
6.8.3 Discussion
Several facts concerning the STR-TRNG core can be derived from implementation results:
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• Although the implementation of the Muller cell in LUT based FPGAs (most of currently
available FPGAs) is relatively simple, the STR-TRNG needs careful placement and rout-
ing to guarantee the evenly spaced mode (and thus precise timing between events) and to
maintain the frequency as high as possible (since the number of events circulating inside
the ring is constant and guaranteed by the initialization of Muller cell at start up, the
phase difference between events is reduced with reduced clock period and, consequently,
the entropy rate is thus higher).
• The output bit rate is extremely high at the expense of high power consumption.
• The entropy rate is relatively high regarding the high bit rate.
6.9 Study of the RO-PUF and TERO-PUF Core Imple-
mented in FPGA
6.9.1 PUF design
The architecture of the RO-PUF implemented in FPGA is presented in Fig. 6.10. It is composed
of two groups of 16 ring oscillators having the topology presented in Fig. 2.5 (right panel): each
RO contains one NAND gate and twelve non-inverting buffers. The controller generates the
time base signal from the input clock (clk). Depending on this time base signal, it selects one
of sixteen couples of ROs using two multiplexers.
Number of periods of the clock signal present at the output of each multiplexer is counted
in two synchronous 10-bit counters during each time base period. The arbiter detects which
counter reaches its maximum value as the first one (i.e. the most significant bit of the corre-
sponding counter toggles as the first one). If it is the one of Channel A (upper ROs in Fig. 2.5),
the output of the arbiter is set to one, if it is the one of Channel B, the arbiter output is reset
to zero.
Since in the first version of the RO-PUF all ring oscillator oscillated permanently, the power
consumption was relatively high. However, at any time, just two out of 32 rings were needed.
Therefore, in the power optimized version depicted in Fig. 6.11, the unused rings were stopped
using demultiplexers. The rest of the PUF circuitry remained unchanged.
The TERO-PUF implemented in selected FPGA is depicted in Fig. 6.12. It is composed of
two groups of 16 transition effect ring oscillators: each TERO contains one NAND gate and
six non-inverting buffers in both branches. The controller generates the time base signal from
the input clock (clk). Depending on this time base signal, it selects one of sixteen couples of
TEROs using two multiplexers.
Number of oscillation periods of the two TERO cells selected by multiplexers is counted in two
synchronous 10-bit counters during each measurement interval (the time base period generated
by the controller). The counter values are then subtracted to give up to 3-bit response of the
PUF. The counters are reset at the end of the measurement period and another couple of TERO
cells is selected for measurement.
6.9.2 Implementation Results
The results of implementation of the RO-PUF and TERO-PUF and their cells are presented in
Table 6.7. First, an RO cell (one ring oscillator containing twelve buffers and one NAND gate)
HECTOR D2.1 Page 70 of 85
D2.1- Report on Selected TRNG and PUF Principles
RO cell A.1
Arbiter
Mux
PUF outputSelect RO
n-bit
counter
n-bit
counter
.
.
.
RO cell A.16
RO cell B.1
Mux
.
.
.
RO cell B.16
Controller
4
Reset counters
Strobeclk
ena
ena
'1'
'1'
ena
'1'
'1'
Figure 6.10: Architecture of the RO-PUF as implemented in Spartan 6 FPGA
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Figure 6.11: Power-optimized architecture of the RO-PUF as implemented in Spartan 6 FPGA
and a TERO cell (one transition-effect ring oscillator composed of two branches containing six
buffers and one NAND gate each) were implemented in the device and observed.
The RO cell oscillated at about 80 MHz and the TERO cell at about 180 MHz. Although
the total number of the delay elements (inverters and NAND gates) in two kind of cells (RO
and TERO) was similar, the power consumption was quite different (see the first two lines
in the table). This is mainly due to the fact that the RO cell oscillates permanently and the
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Figure 6.12: Power-optimized architecture of the TERO-PUF as implemented in Spartan 6
FPGA
TERO cell stops to oscillate after some time. When it stops to oscillate, the power consumption
significantly reduces. Of course, using shorter measurement periods in the TERO-PUF, would
increase the power consumption, but also decrease the measurement latency. In order to get
comparable results, the measurement period was set up for both RO-PUF and TERO-PUF to
about 16 µs.
As can be observed in Table 6.7, the RO-PUF optimized for the power consumption consumes
four times less power than the straightforward architecture of the RO-PUF at the expense of
slightly more than 10% area extension, which is due mainly to the use of demultiplexers.
Table 6.7: Results of implementation of the RO-PUF and TERO-PUF in the Xilinx Spartan 6
FPGA family
DUT Area Power consumption Nb bits per challenge
(LUT/Reg/L&R) [mW]
RO cell (1 NAND + 12 Buf.) 13/0/0 1.4 –
TERO cell (1 NAND + 6 Buf.) x 2 14/0/0 0.5 –
RO-PUF (2 x 16 ROs) 177/0/37 14.2 1
RO-PUF optimized for power 191/0/39 2.9 1
TERO-PUF (2 x 16 TEROs) 343/1/38 3.8 up to 3
The TERO-PUF has almost the same structure as the RO-PUF. The only difference is that
instead of using simpler arbiter, it uses more complex subtractor, which occupies more area
and consumes more energy. In return, the PUF response has up to three bits. However, it
must be taken into account that according to [14], the quality of the PUF in term of steadiness,
uniqueness and randomness deteriorates when using three bits per challenge.
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6.9.3 Discussion
Several facts concerning the RO-PUF and TERO-PUF core can be derived from implementation
results:
• The RO-PUF and TERO-PUF have very similar structure, but give different results.
• The TERO-PUF consumes more power, probably because TERO cells oscillate at higher
frequency and the counters counting at higher frequency consume more power. However,
it must be taken into account that the power consumption of the TERO-PUF can be
reduced by increasing the period of the control signal (the oscillation will last relatively
shorter time period regarding the total measurement time).
• When using only one bit per challenge in the TERO-PUF, the RO-PUF and TERO-PUF
give similar statistical results. However, it seems that the TERO-PUF is more difficult
to manipulate (to attack).
6.10 Discussion on FPGA Implementation of Selected
TRNG Cores
As explained above, the aim of implementation of selected cores of TRNGs in FPGA was to
fairly evaluate their design and operation when operating in the same conditions. Thanks to the
flexibility of FPGAs, many DUT configurations and topologies could be tested in a relatively
short time. We have to stress again that we are aware that some of the obtained results and
observations (e.g. availability of logic and routing resources or feasibility) cannot be directly
generalized to ASICs and that other strategies of evaluation must be adopted to them.
In the next paragraphs, we will evaluate and briefly discuss the first results obtained in the
Xilinx Spartan 6 family. In order to fairly evaluate selected designs, we propose to compare the
next parameters:
• Area – the final area will be given in logic elements (i.e. logic cells) occupied by the design
(in the context of results presented in previous sections, the area will be proportional to
the sum of LUTs, registers and combined LUTs and registers, since each of these objects
occupies one logic element).
• Power consumption in mW – this parameter will give the power consumption only of the
core of the TRNG.
• Bit rate in Mbits/s – since the data interface is faster (400 MBits/s) than all available
TRNG designs, the speed of the acquisition card will not limit the speed of the data
transfer.
• Entropy rate per output bit – the entropy will be estimated using the NIST SP 800-90B
procedure.
• Entropy and bit rate product – since the bit rate and the entropy rate at the output of
the generator are closely related (output with high bit rate and low entropy rate can be
post-processed, in order to increase entropy at the expense of decrease of the bit rate),
they should be evaluated together using the same parameter. We use the product of the
entropy rate and of the bit rate.
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• Feasibility and repeatability – this evaluation parameter will reflect the difficulty of the
design and its repeatability across selected FPGA family. The parameter value is divided
into six levels, which will be explained later.
In the next step, we propose to attribute a score to all above mentioned TRNG parameters.
The proposed score scale is between 0 (the lowest score) to 5 (the highest score) according to
Table 6.8.
Table 6.8: Scoring intervals for TRNG parameters
Parameter 5 4 3 2 1 0
Area [Logic cells] < 20 20 – 99 100 – 199 200 – 499 500 – 999 > 999
Power [mW] < 0.01 0.01 – 0.09 0.1 – 0.9 1.0 – 9.9 10 – 99.9 > 99.9
Bit rate [Mbits/s] > 99 99 – 10 9.9 – 1 0.99 – 0.1 0.099 – 0.01 < 0.01
Entropy rate > 0.997 0.997 – 0.99 9.989 – 0.9 0.899 – 0.5 0.499 – 0.1 < 0.1
Entropy * Bit rate > 99 99 – 10 9.9 – 0.9 0.9 – 0.05 0.05 – 0.001 < 0.001
Feasib. & repeatability Automatic Man. setup Man. setup Man. setup Man. setup Random
all families per family iterative complex per device results
While the score scale of the first five parameters is quite straightforward, the scale of the
Feasibility and repeatability needs some explanation.
The highest score (5) will be given to designs that do not need any manual intervention and
the obtained results are always satisfactory, independently from the family. The results are
repeatable for all devices.
A score of 4 will be given to designs that need some simple manual setup depending on the
family (e.g. manual placement) and the obtained results are repeatable between devices inside
the same family.
A score of 3 will be given to designs that need a manual setup (optimization of parameters)
in an iterative manner. This manual optimization cannot be automatically translated from one
family to another, but remains the same for all devices in the same family (repeatability).
A score of 2 will be given to designs that necessitate the use of some complex algorithms
(optimization of the topology and routing). The obtained results are the same for all devices
in the same family (repeatability).
A score 1 will be given to designs that need manual setup for each device individually, but a
satisfactory solution can always be obtained.
A score 0 will be given to designs, in which satisfactory results cannot be guaranteed (they
appear randomly).
Table 6.9 presents a summary of implementation results of selected TRNG designs. It can
be observed that the ELO-TRNG occupies relatively small area and consumes relatively low
power. It is also very easy to implement (highest feasibility and repeatability). It also reaches
the highest entropy rate between evaluated generators at the expense of very small bit rate.
The COSO-TRNG occupies the smallest area and consumes the lowest power. It has an
interesting bit rate. However it is difficult to implement (low feasibility and repeatability). It
also reaches a high entropy rate and relatively high entropy and bit rate product (EBR).
We obtained very interesting results with the STR-TRNG. It has the highest bit rate and
relatively high entropy and thus very high EBR. On the other hand, it has the highest power
consumption and it is relatively difficult to implement.
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Table 6.9: Summary of implementation results of selected TRNGs
TRNG type Area Power Bit rate Entropy E * BR
(LUT/Reg/L&R) [mW] [Mbits/s] per bit
ELO 41 1.38 0.003 0.986 0.003
COSO 8 0.80 1.32 0.960 1.267
PLL 28 10.5 0.355 0.860 0.305
DC 175 9.66 62.5 0.1105 6.906
TERO 45 1 0.419 0.275 0.115
STR 177 18.9 143 0.931 133.062
Table 6.10 presents scores of implementation of selected TRNG designs. As could be expected
from the previous analysis, the STR-TRNG obtained the highest score, followed by COSO-
TRNG and DC-TRNG, but the differences are very small.
Table 6.10: Scores of selected TRNGs
TRNG Area Power Bit rate Entropy E * BR Feas. & Repeat. Total score
ELO 4 2 0 3 1 5 15
COSO 5 3 3 3 3 1 18
PLL 4 1 2 2 2 4 15
DC 3 2 4 1 3 4 17
TERO 4 2 2 1 2 1 12
STR 3 1 5 3 5 2 19
Obtained results can be better analyzed using the circular area charts of individual TRNGs
presented in Fig. 6.13.
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Figure 6.13: Circular area charts of scores of evaluated TRNGs in Spartan 6 FPGA
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The presented designs were implemented in Spartan 6 family. We can expect that imple-
mentation in other FPGA families will give similar results. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude
that some designs, which will be easy to implement in one FPGA family will be more difficult
or even impossible to implement in another family. Therefore, we plan to implement selected
designs also in Altera Cyclone V and Microsemi Smart Fusion 2 families in the near future.
6.11 Discussion on FPGA Implementation of Selected
PUF Cores
Similarly to the TRNG evaluation, we will evaluate and briefly discuss the first results in
implementation of selected PUF cores in the Xilinx Spartan 6 family. At this stage of the
project, we compare the next parameters:
• Area – the final area will be given in logic elements (i.e. logic cells) occupied by the design
(in the context of results presented in previous sections, the area will be proportional to
the sum of LUTs, registers and combined LUTs and registers, since each of these objects
occupies one logic element).
• Power consumption in mW – this parameter will give the power consumption only of the
core of the PUF.
• Number of bits per challenge – gives number of bits obtained at the output of the PUF
function as response to the challenge.
• Power consumption per output bit – this parameter characterizes the power needed per
generation of one output bit.
• Feasibility and repeatability – this evaluation parameter will reflect the difficulty of the
design and its repeatability across selected FPGA family. Like in TRNG implementations,
the parameter value is divided into six levels.
In the next step, we propose to attribute a score to all above mentioned PUF parameters.
The proposed score scale is between 0 (the lowest score) to 5 (the highest score) according to
Table 6.11.
Table 6.11: Scoring intervals for PUF parameters
Parameter 5 4 3 2 1 0
Area [Logic cells] < 20 20 – 99 100 – 199 200 – 499 500 – 999 > 999
Power [mW] < 0.01 0.01 – 0.09 0.1 – 0.9 1.0 – 9.9 10 – 99.9 > 99,9
Nbits/ch > 4 4 3 2 1 0
Power/bit < 0.001 0.001 – 0.05 0.05 – 0.9 0.9 – 9.9 10 – 99 > 99
Feasib. & repeatability Automatic Man. setup Man. setup Man. setup Man. setup Random
all families per family iterative complex per device results
Parameters like Area, Power, and Feasibility and Repeatability have the same scoring as in
the previous section. The scoring of Number of bits per challenge is quite straightforward. The
scoring of parameter Power/bit is derived from the scoring of the previous two parameters
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Table 6.12: Summary of implementation results of selected PUFs
PUF type Area Power Nbits/ch Power/bit
(LUT/Reg/L&R) [mW] [mW]
RO 214 14.2 1 14.2
RO Power Opt. 230 2.9 1 2.9
TERO 382 3.8 3 1.27
(Power and Number of bits per challenge). Table 6.12 presents a summary of implementation
results of selected PUF designs. It can be observed that the RO-PUF occupies relatively small
area, but consumes relatively high power. It is relatively easy to implement (highest feasibility
and repeatability), but it gives only one bit per challenge.
The RO-PUF optimized for power occupies slightly bigger area, but the power consumption
is considerably lower. Although the TERO-PUF consumes a little bit more power, it gives more
bits per challenge. The power consumption per bit is thus lower.
Table 6.13 presents scores of implementation of selected PUF designs. As could be expected
from the previous analysis, the TERO-PUF obtained the highest score, followed by RO-PUF
optimized for power and RO-PUF without optimization.
Table 6.13: Scores of selected PUFs
PUF type Area Power Nbits/ch Power/bit Feas. & Repeat. Total score
RO 2 1 1 1 4 9
RO Power Opt. 2 2 1 2 4 11
TERO 2 2 3 3 3 13
Obtained results can be better analyzed using the circular area charts of individual PUFs
presented in Fig. 6.14.
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Figure 6.14: Circular area charts of scores of evaluated PUFs in Spartan 6 FPGA
Similarly to TRNGs, the presented PUF designs were implemented in Spartan 6 family. Since
we cannot exclude that some designs, which will be easy to implement in one FPGA family
will be more difficult or even impossible to implement in another family, we plan to implement
selected PUF designs also in Altera Cyclone V and Microsemi Smart Fusion 2 families in the
near future.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
According to the analysis presented in this deliverable, it is clear that some ideal TRNG or
PUF design does not and will not exist. Consequently, designers will always be obliged to do
some compromises according to the requirements of their targeted application.
In order to cover the largest spectrum of requirements and to avoid the case that no practical
solution would be available, several TRNG and PUF principles have been pre-selected at this
first stage of the HECTOR project (Task 2.1).
The TRNG and PUF evaluations and comparisons given above were first made according to
results published in journal papers and conference proceedings, and also according to practical
experiments realized in the past few years by some partners involved in the HECTOR project.
In order to make these evaluations more objective, selected principles were implemented in
the Spartan 6 FPGA family using the Evariste hardware/software tools. Once the HECTOR
evaluation boards will be available, the same designs will also be implemented Cyclone V and
Smart Fusion 3 families and the obtained results will be compared with those obtained for the
Spartan 6 family.
According to obtained results, the list of selected TRNGs and PUF should be reduced. The
final candidates should be then studied in more details, and the stochastic models, embedded
tests and post-processing functions should be proposed in Task 2.2 and 2.3 and implemented
in Task 2.4.
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Chapter 8
List of Abbreviations
ASIC Application specific integrated circuit
D-FF D flip-flop
DRNG Deterministic random number generator
EMA Electromagnetic analysis
EMI Electromagnetic interference
FIPS Federal information processing standard
FPGA Field programmable logic array
HDA Helper data algorithm
HDRNG Hybrid deterministic random number generator
HTRNG Hybrid true random number generator
IID Independent and identically distributed
IP Intellectual property
LVDS Low voltage differential signaling
MPV Manufacturing process variability
NIST National institute of standards and technology
PDF Probability distribution function
PLL Phase-locked loop
PTRNG Physical true random number generator
PUF Physical unclonable function
RNG Random number generator
RO Ring oscillator
STR Self-timed ring
TERO Transition effect ring oscillator
TRNG True random number generator
VCO Voltage controlled oscillator
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